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PREFACE

When I began study in Hegel's philosophy a couple of years
ago, I soon discovered that getting started in the system ilv.a
veritable jungle. I found myself reduced to the expedient of reading
and re-reading countless pages in book after book, but even then
the task seemed hopeless. Having finally gained some working
knowledge of the Hegelian system, it is my hope that this cursory
introduction to the philosophy of Hegel will save others from the
same dire labors and hours of frustration which I endured.
This introduction is designed to aid a person with the
desire to study the Hegelian philosophy of religion; it is not
itself an introduction to his philosophy of religion (this ought
to be obvious from the relative length of the early chapters and
the relative brevity of the last two chapter0. It is hoped that
three particular enemies of the reader in Hegel's philosophy can
be overcome in this paper: the tracing of origins, the identification
of main principles, and the vast literature.
The first chapter is devoted to the roots of Hegel's philosophy. Initial exposure to this chapter may evoke the response
that it is too involved and lengthy, but it will become apparent
that it is precisely this kind of background material which gives
a reader essential insights. This material is not found in any
particular group of sources; it must be gleaned, point by point,
from many sources.
The second, third, and fourth chapters are devoted to an

Preface, continued.
exposition of his philosophy in its main outlines. The purpose
of this exposition is to pinpoint the major principles whrch
are operative in his philosophy. The problem which all four of
the first chapters intends to alleviate is the fact that these
principles are not clearly explicated in any small group of sources.
The reader soon finds himself reading either general discussions
which gloss over the key points of difficulty, or engulfed .byk
a deluge of technical literature which discusses perhaps only one
or two of many desired points. It is the purpose of this paper
to congeal these many points into a simple, connected exposition.
The mountain of literature is also a hazard which must be
faced. One part of this problem is the fact that there is so much
that one has no idea where to start, and what materials are in
what source. The other part of the literature problem is also a
familiar one, that one does not know whom to trust. Hopefully,
if the reader will venture to trust the reports given at the end
of each section, this dual problem will be alleviated.
As mentioned above, this is not an introduction to his
philosophy of religion. Besides being a topic much beyond the
possible length of the paper, there are compe4t books on the
subject. The purpose ofithis paper is rather to prepare the
reader to study the philosophy of religion with comprehension.
For this reason, the coverage of the actual philosophy of religion
the conclusion
in chapter Five and A: is much more basic and the literaturereports are much smaller. (Besides, the literature is so• massive
that it would be more confusing than helpful.)
Regarding the extent of the originality in this paper, I
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should say that on the whole, the material is digested from a
multitude of sources and explained in my own fashion. Several
insights were not found in any resource.
It seems appropriate that I acknowledge here a great debt
to Dr. James Collins. It was in a seminar which he conducted
that I was led to begin studies in Hegel, and I owe a great deal
to his penetrating scholarship both in the classroom and in the
pages of his books.

A Note on Abbreviations

The following abbreviations refer to books described in the
Bibliography, as follows:
Phen.

Phenomenology of Spirit, translation by Miller

PhAn.

Phanomenologie des Geistes, volume 9 of the
Gesammelte Werke

Science of Logic

This is the Miller translation.

Wissenschaft der Logik

This is the Lasson edition, in the
Philosophischen Bibliothek edition.

Chapter One: Influences on Hegel's Development

An enduring nemesis of the historian of thought is the fact
that every thinker (indeed, every age) is both a result

of

what transpired before and also an individual entity with an
inexpressible cenipa. There is a tension between study of the
concrete formative influences on a thinker and the unique personal
insights of the person. We will not understand Hegel by simply
reading about his age and influences, nor will we understand him
by reading summaries of his works in an encyclopedia. In order to
reach a balance between influence and individualjty, we will in
the first two chapters cover background material and in the third
and fourth chapters cover the essentials of his system in general.'
In this first chapter we will cover the following five areas
of influence on his philosophy: Greek philosophy, Rationalism,
2
the Enlightenment, Post-Rantian Idealism, and Romanticis*.
A. Greek philosophy
It is with good reason that Hegel is often called the
"German Aristotle." Not only were his interests as broad as
Aristotle's; Hegel managed to incorporate much more Greek thought
into his philosophy than his contemporaries (who were also involved
in a kind of Greek revival). We will introduce the matter with
a brief note, and then see how Greek philosophy influenced Hegel.
1. Ancients and Moderns. In the "history of ideas" literature

there is frequent reference to "the quarrel between the ancients
and the moderns." This is a convenient way to get at much of
what Hegel wanted to accomplish in his philosophy.3 The problem
is usually set up in terms of a "quarrel" over the applicability
of ancient learning to modern intellectual growth. The problem
surfaced in the seventeenth century, when the ideals of Sir
Francis Bacon came to the forefront in scientific experiments.
Bacon called for banishment of the anti-experimental attitude
in Greek science which had paralyzed research in the Middle Ages.
Thus he became a pioneer in the direct observation approach to
scientific learning. The three points of contention which the
seventeenth century raised against the ancients may be summarized
as: an attack on tha authority of the untested wisdom of the
ancients, impatience with those who copy books in lieu of observing
nature, and the importance of inductive experiments.4 As we will
see, this new way of doing scientific study led to a new world
view which was scandalously different from that of the Greeks.
Although the study of Jones is limited to Englamdi: it covers
the topic thoroughly. This theme is also applied to areas
of learning other than science, including literature. A
more general survey is to be found in the excellent treatment
of Randall, chapters IX and X. See also Phen 19/PhAn 28.
2. Plato and his predecessors. The pre-Socratic philosophers
are certainly important in understanding Hegel's development.
This is so partly because their philosophy became the basis for
Plato's thought (very important to Hegel) and partly because
Hegel was directly influenced by their thoughts. Of particular
interest are Anaxagoras (praised for his theory of voOc; note
Phen 34/PhAn 40), Heraclitus (whose dictum ndvra pet Hegel
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viewed as an early expression of his own philosophy of absolute
Werden ["becoming"]), and the Eleatics (Zeno and Parmenides in

particular) who discovered the limits of, merely dialectiCal
reasoning.
Hegel had a veri high.Tegard for the thought of Socrates
(c.470-399 BC.) and Plato (428-348 BC.). He considered Socrates
the first to discuss conscious subjectivity and the notion of
universal truth. Socrates' emphasis was on the Universal, in
opposition to the arbitrariness of the Sophists, and this made
him an immensely important figure in Hegel's eyes. Unfortunately,
the Socratic dialectic (as reported by Plato) was often as
destructive as it was constructive.
We will note four primary aspects of Plato's phiiposophy
which are important for understanding Hegel. First, Plato's claim
that the Forms baocaLJ are the basis of reality seemed to Hegel
to foreshadow his own doctrine of the Idea. Second, Plato's
understanding that reality is two-tiered, with the sensible reality in flux around us and the true reality, the Forms, fixed above,
seemed to Hegel to be important in reminding us that the world
as it, appears around us is one of deception and endless change
(this is the meaning of the cryptic passage in Phen section 47/
PhAn page 35). Third, Hegel believed that Plato's philosophy
approximates closer to his than most later philosophers, because
Plato's conceptual apparatus was more flexible. Fourth, the
Platonic doctrine of 4vduvna.cj [reminiscence]is of great significance for Hegel (e.g., note Phen section 13/PhAn p.15).
The material probably more helpful thanirany other one source
is in Gadamer's f+rat essay. Gadamer's well-seasoned schol-
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arship is evident (but the translation is poor--see the
original, cited in the bibliography of articles at the end
of this paper). The essay of Findlay in O'Malley History
is helpful, but the criticisms of Palmer which follow it
are justified. MalUschke has a very helpful analysis of
how Hegel viewed Plato's Parmenides on pp. 43-54. Stace
is interesting but typically verbose and not entirely
accurate. Wiehl focuses on the roots of Hegel's metaphysics
in Plato's predecessors and in Plato's theory of Forms.
Bloch's chapter "Hegel and die Anamnesis; Contra Bann der
Anamnesis" is a reasonably accurate assessment of Hegel's
doctrine, but Bloch does not hesitate to disagree with
Hegel's whole theory of Erinnerung [remembering).
3.Aristotle. Hegel's close affinity with the philosophy of
Aristotle is well established, though aspects are woefully in
need of further research. Though there are many points of similarity, we will isolate the four main ones here.
First, Aristotle's teleology is conspicuously vresint,An
Hegel's cosmology.

Not only does the word Zweck and its com-

pounds appear frequently in his writings (e.g. Gauvin's Wortindex
lists over 250 instances of Zweck in the PhAnomenologie des

Colston

alone) ; the very Aristotelian view of teleology as immanent in
nature is clearly also Hegel's own position.
Second, the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism is present
in Hegel's philosophy in at least two ways. The more obvious
presence is simply in Bagel's dialectical pattern, as he claims
that we begin with a universal, qualify it with a particular claim
(for him, "negation"), and draw a conclusion which is neither
of the prewisses alone, but a new synthetic thesis. The presence
of this influence is (I believe) attested to by the frequency
with which we find the word for "(logical)middle term" [mitt.)
appearing in the non-logical works (e.g., according to the Wortindex
the word Witte appears 63 times in the Phlinomenologle.
The other use of Aristotle's syllogistic is to be found in
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Hegel's account of how philosophical "knowledge" progresses and
accumulates. Remembering that for Aristotle and for Hegel "science"
is not an empirical gathering of facts (the modern approach) but
absolute truth, Aristotle claims that we attain scientific truth
by stadting with the definition of the essence of the thing as
the major premiss of the syllogism, adding a minor (particular)
premiss gained from experience, and reaching a conclusion. The
conclusion is then the new major premiss for a further syllogism,
and knowledge i thereby accumulated. Aristotle claims that
definitions are formed by a process of induction itumwori]
from experience (Posterior Analytics 11,19). On the basis of
Aristotle's claim that the definition of definition contains
both a universal genus and also difference (Metaphysics 1037b1038a) we may note that Hegel starts on a similar note in the ,
logical progression of his metaphysics. Further, as in the syllogism of Aristotle, the universal-particular-conclusion pattern
is fundamental to the movement of his system. Finally, the
Hegelian notion of Erfahrung (experience] as the source of the
middle terms for the "syllogism" of philosophy runs parallel to
Some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. (See pp.44-45 below.)
Third, Aristotle differed from Plato in taking the essences
of things out of the "beyond" and placing them in the things
themselves. Hegel and Aristotle agree that the essence of the
thing is in the thing (compare Aristotle's criticism of Plato's
Forms add Hegel's criticism of Kant's "thing-in-itself"), that
it is a self-contained unit and that its essence can be discerned
from it (this is the point of Hegel's clever use of the word for
perception, Wahrnehmung ("grasping the true"]). This. is parallel
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to Aristotle's use of the concept of intuition (vo0c), that
we intuitively know the essences which are contained in a
definition and thereby know the o6aCa or r6 TL fiv etym.. Further,
as we will see, Hegel's vocables Selbstsweck
goal] and

[self-contained-

Mirklichkeit (actuality (=2"balanced reality")] approx-

imate to Aristotle's evyeXixem [actuality, form, essence].
Finally, it seems that Hegel's concept of "God" was inspired
by Aristotle's famous characterization of god as "thought thinking
on thinking" (Metaphysics 1072b, quoted by Hegel at length at the
end of the Encyclopedia).
The outstanding treatment of the relation between Aristotle
and Hegel is by Mure. As a major translattor of the Oxford
edition of Aristotle's works, he is eminently qualified to
discuss their relationship.. Others especially helpful are
Gray, Weiss (Hegel's Critique), and Findlay (Re -examination).
Also helpful in a broad way are Gadamer's first essay and
Rosen (who is good on the whole topic of Greek philosophy
in Hegel). One who is seeking a very basic discubsion will
find Stace tielpful. Regarding the connection between Aristotle's defi4ion of'definition and Hegel's metaphysics, the
only literature I am aware of is a remark in Glockner's
essay (p.82, fn.14). This deserves more investigation.
4.Neoplatonism and mysticism. There is certainly a strong element
of Neoplatonic influence in Hegel's philosophy. This is most
evident in the basic cosmological doctrine of Neoplatonism, the
exit - reditus

pattern. Neoplatonists typically held that the

ultimate reality is the (Me, which is beyond time and space (and
our knowing). From the One emanated the divine mind (not a deity
to be worshipped), from which emanated the entire world. There
is thus an

exit

of the world from the divine mind, and at the end

of time there will be a great return

(reditus)

to the divine mind.

This is a more picturesque way of stating the main point of Hegel's
philosophy.
The outstanding source on this relation is Rosen, pp. 52ff.
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Bloch also has some helpful material on pp. 479-480. Research
in this area is woefully lacking.
Also of interest is the hereitage of German mysticism which
its mark on Hegel. Of particular interest is Jakob BOhme (15751624), who receives high praise from Hegel. B8hme was a visionary
mystic who claimed to have seen_ "the Being of Beings, the Byes
and the Abyss, the eternal generation of the Trinity, the origin
and descent of this world, and of all creatures through the Divine
Wisdom" (Second Epistle, section 6). He claimed to have seen the
Urgrpnd, the metaphysical gtourid of being, and claimed that the
Urgrund has a will for self-knowledge (cc the Father) which gener-

ates and "knows") a "heart" (not a literal heart, of course)
which is the Son. Emanating from these two is the "moving life"
(21: the Spirit); this triadic relationship is the pattern for the
existing world. While much more could be mentioned from'his
philosophy which would elucidate Hegel, this ought to be sufficent
to show the kind of influence which certainly exists.
An excellent resource on this topic is the dissertation of
Annegrit Brunkhorst-Hasenclever, pp. 257-264. Bloch maintains the largely tenable thesis that Hegel's language is
actually a melting pot of many "languages": theological,
mystical, attistic, Swabian idioms, aphorisms, catchwords
of the Romantics, etc. (pp.18-21).
B. Rationalism
1. Descartes. Hegel affirmed what has traditionally been said
of Descartes (1596-1650), that he is the fQder of modern philosophy. This is so, it is commonly agreed, because Descartes
took the "transcendental turn" to the consciousness of the thinking
subject. We note, that Descartes began his philosophy on "systematic doubt" of everything except the premiss "I think, there-
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fore I am." He was convinced that God has placed"dear and
distinct" ideas in his mind, and since it is impossible for God
to deceive, these ideas are an adequate basis of knowledge. (His
thought is viciously circular: the veracity of my knowledge is
guaranteed by God, and the notion of God is itself a "clear and
distinct" idea.) Hegel praises Descartes for takingtthis turn
to the consciousness (Hegel's own Phenomenology starts with the
consciousness), but Hegel faults Descartes for stopping at a
single stage of doubt (negation). It is not, on Hegelian grounds,
sufficent to recognize finitudeity negating; we must negate the
negation.
We can also note Hegel's affinity with the movement called
Rationalism (of which Descartes is acknowledged to be the "founder")
There are two basic points which Hegel's vision shared with the
aims of Rationalism: "1) the objective of coming to a comprehension
of the All (daS Ganze)p the totality of being, or, as they frequently called it, the 'Absolute'; 2) the objective of describing
the world precisely as an organized system of Reason„"5
The article by Weiss ("Cartesian Doubt and Hegelian Negation")
in O'Malley (History)summarizes the situation very well.
An equally worthwhile treatment is to be found in Navickas,
chapter 1.
2,Spinoza; Hegel regarded Spinoza (1632-1677) as the most
important rationalist, and we will be well repaid if we find out
why. Spinoza may well have been the greatest single influence.
on Hegel's philosophy.
A key axiom in Spinoza's system is mania determinatlo est
negatio(every determination is a negation). By this he means
that when the infinite is determined (meaning "limited", not
"caused") there are particular restraints placed on it. Whenever
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infinite being is qualified (as is the case when we designate
existing particular things) Wire is also a finitOde or negativity
expressed. All existing things share the characteristic finitude
which is a limit, or negativity, in its relationship to infinite
Substance.
Hegel takes the liberty of converting Spinoza's formula
("liberty" because this is not justified on logical grounds) to
a formula which suits his purpose: nallinegation is determination
[Bestimmtheit]". This is the most basic principle in Hegel's
philosophy. Although all positive descriptdon is, as Spinoza
says, negative, it is thus equally true that all these finite
determinations are positively existing. In other words, it is
equally true to say that all (limiting) determination is egation
and all negativity is positively existing. In the context of
Hegel's system, we can further say that all that exists is
essentially negative. Negativity is the foundatiin of all existing
things.
Hegel's criticism of Spinoza in this matter is based on the
fact that Spinoza stopped with a single negation. Hegel holds
that without a negation of negation, the particularity which is
entailed by the first negation will never be overcome an4here
will be no unity. In other words, it is necessary to negate the
finitude which is implicit in the first negation if we are to
unite reality. More will be said About this in the discussion
of dialectic in Chapter IV.
There is another point on which we see the direct.influence
of Spinoza on Hegel's philosophy. Spinoza rightly affirms that
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the infinite, properly conceived, is completely free from limits
and particulars/determinations. Since the infinite is undetermined, it is impossible to attribute any qualities to it, and
hence even to think or speak about it. This approach is certainly
evident in how Hegel treats the Idea (and ordinary mental concepts),
claiming that without the particulars of human experience the
universal is empty and meaningless. (But this is also in Kant:
"Gedanken ohne Inhalt rind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe rind
blind" [thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without
concepts are blind" Katlic der reinen Vernunft, A51/1975).
Finally, we note in passing Spinoza's infamous formula Deus
sive Nature [God or Nature; God = Nature]. Spinoza is ordinarily

called a pantheist because he recognized no real distinction between
God and Nature. We cannot discuss the implicit influence of
his monotheistic Jewish background on this view, but it is
important to see a similarity between his conclusion and that
of Hegel (who held that "God" became the world). Spinozism was
very popular among the Romantics at Hegel's time. For example,
Goethe was known to carry a copy of Spinoza's Ethics

in his

coat-.pocket, and Hegel's predecessor in the first chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, Fichte, generated such an
AthelsZmusstreit [atheism-tontroversyl while at• _the Upiversity

of Jena that he was compelled to leave in 1799. Hegel's close
friend and co-editor of a journal '.Schelling was & known pantheist.
A very good treatment of this connection is to be found in
NalUschke, Chapter 3. Sarlemijn, pp. 121-124, is extre#mely
important, as is Rotenstreich, passim. Stace's treatment
is brief but substantial (pp. 32-34).
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C. The Enlightenment
The complex nature of what is usually called the Aufkl&rung
[Enlightenment] is such that it is very difficult to characterize
it accurately. It involved the physics of Newton, the anthropology
of Hume and Kant, and the social theories of Hobbes and Rousseau,
to name just a few strands of activity. We may portray the outcome of this age by summarizing the resulting anthropological
problems in two statements. First, it became necessary to clarify
(auflaaren)

the new-found human subjectivity in its relation to

the new-found scientific objective reality (understood by Romantics as the problem of the "one and all"). Second, it became
necessary to clarify the general conclusion that as part of nature
man is subject to the same natural laws as the restiof nature
(understood by the Romantics as the problem of human freedom).
We note that these are the two very problems which Kant, the
epitome of Enlightenment thinkers, felt constrained to address
(" the starry skies above and the moral order within").
1. Rousseau. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) formulated a
theory of religion which greatly influenced Kant and the young
Hegel. Rousseau claimed that whatever is convincing in the
"sincerity of the heart" demands our assent. This, combined with
his conviction that the conscience is essentially pure but often
corrupted by corrupt society, forms the basis for his religious
thought. His philosophy is based on a sort of Cartesian certainty,
whereby the convictions of the heart are guarantedd by a superior
being called God. Self-certainty is both the basis for our
conviction that God guarantees truth and for assurance that our
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moral beliefs are well-grounded.
It is well known that Kant tried to modify this scheme with
the substitution of human reason for the immediate certainty of
God's work in the conscience. Thus, for Kant, rational deliberation
is the new basis for grounding our moral decisions. This becomes
a moral theology when Kant adds the claim that there must be some
connection between moral goods here on earth and some reward
for attending to these goods. It is God who supplies the necessary connection between goods and rewards with the promise
of a blessed hereafter.
Clearly, this is not a convincing rehabilitation of,Rousseau,
either from the standpoint of traditional theology or from a
perspective or moral philosophy. Nonetheless, this was the
approach which the young Hegel and his comrades embraced while
in their formative years at the Tubingen Seminary.
Despite the importance of this connection, the literature
is alarmingly small. The best explicit treatment is by
Dieter Henrich in Christiansen (Hegel and the Philosophy
of Religion). The first chapter of Taylor is also particutarly useful. A more general discussion is generated
by Kreger. On Hegel's enthusiasm for Rousseau as a
Revolutionary dUring his Tubingen days see Rosenkranz (3234) and Wiedmann(English version) pp. 19-22.
2. Kant. Trying to describe the relationship between the
philosophies of Immanuel Kant (1724-1604) and Hegel in the space
of a few paragraphs is an extremely difficult task. Hopefully,
what follows is an adequate indication of what is happening;
clarification can be gained from the sourcesllisted at the end
of this section. In the material which follows, we will try to
achieve the following goals: a) show how Kant's philosophy
set up a problem which Hegel tried to remedy, b) note Kant's
treatment of the proofs for God's existence, and c) note how
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Kant's philosophy of religion set the stage.fer Hegel's early
encounters with Christianity.
a. The kantian philosophy in general. In agreement with
the skeptical philosophy of Hume, Kant acknowedged that the
general problem of philosophy is to determine the grounds for
certainty in knowledge. Kant allowed Hume's claim that the
mind is barraged by a storm of confused sense-data, but added
his own claim that the mind structures the data. Kant further
claimed that the mind operates on three levels: sensibility (i.e.
sense perception), understanding IVerstandl, and reason Ivernunft].
The two forms of sensibility which order the incoming data are
space and time. While the forms of sensibility fall under what
he calls the "Transcendental Aesthetic" (transcerigental referring to the fact that this faculty is above the material it puts=;
in order), the understanding operates with the "Transcendental
Analytic." This function of the mind is to organize and describe
what is grasped by sensibility in propositional statements. These
two functions of the mind are strictly confined to knowledge
deritried from sense experience, but the faculty of reason goes
beyond these c ncepts to what is not observable. The faculty
of reason (using the "Transcendental Dialectic") is concerned
with what are usually called theology and metaphysics.
While knowledge gained from sensibility and understanding
is on certain footing, he claims, because it is based on experience, the ideas of the faculty o4reason are only postulates.
The three postulates (corresponding to the traditional Rationalist
categories [viz. Whiffler))) are God, the World, and the Soul.
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None of these are observable, and each is frought with problems
in the history of thought. Regarding rational psychology (the
soul) Kant showed the paralogisms (logical fallacies) which attend
the premisses which are nonetheless accepted as true. Regarding
rational cosmology (the world), Kant shows that contradictory
propositions can be proved regarding the status of the world
(antiosmies). Finally, rational theology is impossible, as we
will see.
What good are these ideas of reason? They help us unify our
experiences. The idea of the soul gives us a point around which
to gather our experiences, i.e., a self. The idea of the world
preserves the concept of human freedom, and as we noted above,
the notion of God serves to furnish us with a notion of retribution
and reward necessary for ethics.
Having laid this groundwork, we can now make the application
to Hegel's philosophy. First, we note that what Kant calls the
transcendental dialectic is a purely negative concept. This is
so, because Kant claims that Reason cannot legitimately. form
positive (constitutive) ideas, only negative (regulative) ideas.
This is important, for we can see that Kant is employing Reason
only to keep our lives in order, not to give us information
beyond what is available in sense experience. This brings us
to the Kantian notion of the "thing-in-itself" Was Ding an Bich]
which is a key concept for him. He believes that there must be
a basis for what exists which transcends the things, and he refers
to the hypothetical ground of thskhings which moist as the "taros
in-themselves" (the in-self referring to an abstractiofl or isoititiom
from all sensible matter. The upshot of this is to claim that
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is mere construction of the intellect (note the similarity to
Plato's doctrine of the Forms). It may be said that the entire
enterprise of Hegel consists in an attempt to put the "thing-initself" (which is the rough equivalent to an "essence")back into
the world as Spirit (which is the essence of the world).
b. Kantian morality and Christianity. The Kantian morality
has the division between will and reason as its basic structure.
As noted above, the will is subjected to the demands of moral
reason as the decision-making process of the person attempts to
determine what is the ethical course of action. Though in his
earlier of the "early" writings Hegel follows the basic Kantian
morality in forming his philosophy of religion, he later in the
"early" period attempted to make "love" the unifying force in religion.
c. Proofs of God's existence. Kant recognized three kinds
of demonstrations of God's existence: the Ontological, the Cosmological, and the Physico-theological. We do not have the liberty
to follow more than the conclusions here. The Ontological argument, as Kant understands it, starts from the a priori concept of
God alone. The basis of Kant's rejection of this proof lies in
two areas: first, the concept og an absolutely existing being is
unverifiable, and second, we cannot overcome the gulf between the
(mental) concept and the really existing thing. The Cosmological
argument (from the fact that things exist) and the Physico-theological
(from the experience that there is purpose and order in the world)
break up on several accounts. Most telling is the fact that
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we cannot use the information based on sense data to argue what
is beyond observation, since we are using what is already giVen
as categories in our own minds to prove what is in principle
unprovable. In other words, these proofs are - _,. based on a
sense of orderly existence which is not "in things" but in our
minds. Again, ideas of reason cannot constitute; they can
only regulate.

There is a sizeable literature on this material. For a
general account of Kant, the standard textbooks are fine
(Collins, History, is particularly lucid). Of especial
interest on the problem of knowledge in Kant and Hegel
is Navickas, pp. 6ff. The discussion by Harris in Faith
and Knowledge , pp. 17-25 is extremely important in coming
to grips with the problem of Hegel's appropriation of Kant's
terminology. For a detailed analysis of the proofs ofGod's
existence, see Collins, God in Modern Philosophy. Maluschke's
chapters 4 and 5 are particularly edifying on a more
technical level.
D. Post-Kantian Idealism
The four thinkers which we will consider in this section
are all considered "Idealists." By Idealism we mean an opposition
to both Naturalism and Realism. Idealism is a trend in the history of thought (not confined to any one period of history) which
claims that mind and thought are more real than material objects.
As opposed,to Naturalism, Idealism denies that thought is a process
derived from nature and makes the counter-claim that our very
concept of "nature" is a mental construct. As opposed'to Realism,
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Idealism denies that material things exist independently of the
mind. Idealism claims that "things" as we know them are (in
the radical, or "subjective" form) not "out there" at all, or
(in the more typical form) are unknowable without the structuring
function of the mind. Kantian Idealism is called "Critical
Idealism" because it is of the latter type (in conjunction with
the "critical" philosophy of Hume). The successors to Kant were
quick to spot several fault-lines in his philosophy, and it is
this modified Idealism as expounded by those post-Kantians which
we will address here.
1. Jacobi: the philosophy of religious feeling. Friedrich
Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) was no systematic philosopher, but
an insightful critic of other philosophers. Himself a mystic,
he was deeply influenced by Pietism and was a bitte4anemy of
the antisupernaturalistic religion of the Enlightenment. He was
deeply influenced by Spinoza and Hume. From Spinoza he came
to realize the consequences of rationalistic religion, and felt
deeply repulsed by Sp hozism (which he considered the equivalent
of fatalistic pantheism). He was positively influenced by Hume,
who claimed that the role of religion in life is confined to
the feeling of the reality of the human consciousness.
In opposition to Kant, Jacobi made a radical shift in his
interpretation of the role of faith and reason. Kant clearly
designated the knowledge gained from sensibility and understanding
as the most "real" while relegating Reason to a secondary role.
To state this in ordinary language, Kant placed besaation and
its systematization into the role of rationality, and placed

-18-

"reason" in the role of faith. Jacobi opposed this with &Amore

"common sense" approach, claiming that the immediate intuition
of what we call real (sensation and thoughts of the existing
world) is "faith" because we accept the world around us with
the same immediacy as faith. What Kant calls Reason Jacobi claims
to also be a form of belief, since condepts such as God,
immortality, etc., are not accessable to the understanding except
by faith (in its more usual sense).
The upshot of this is that feeling[Gefehi (usu,lly having

a rather broader meaning than the English "feeling")) is now the
basis of all knowledge. Hegel shows a guarded sympathy for this
view in the early work Glauben and Wissen [Faith and Knowledge,
1802), which stated that all ordinary knowledge is a kind of faith.
Nonetheless, we will see that Hegel castigates this position for
having reduced all knowledge to feeling. As he often said With
reference to Schleiermacher, our knowledge of the absolute truth
is not a matter of edification but a matter of systematic
philososphical knowledge.
We note in passing that this is the source of Schleiermacher's
theology. Granted that Schleiermacher was influenced by other
sources (e.g. Plato, Spinoza), still, Jacobi was the primary
source for ScWeiermacher and, in the twentieth century (with Fries)
also Rudolf Otto.
On the source and content of Jacobi's philosophy, some
excellent sources are Beck, and Ironer 1,303-315. On the
relation of Jacobi to Hegel, see the concise discussion
by Harris in Difference pp. 25-32 and the magi terial
treatment of Bonsiepen, pp.42-3, 55-63.
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2. Fichte: the philosophy of Subjectivity. Johann Gottlieb
Fichte (1762-1814) tried to systematize philosophy around what
he understood to be the main point of Kantianiem, that the self
is primary and is the means of relating to the world.

HiS

phil-

osophy of subjectivity (so called because he starts with the
thinking subject) begins with the Ego (self). and from the
existence of the Ego deduces a system of scientific knowledge
[Wissenschaftslehre]

(again, scientific meaning absolutely true).

He employs a triadic dialectic in the form thesis-antithesissynthesis (this is frequently mistaken for Hegel's dialectic as
well)which follows this pattern: thesis: The Ego posits itself
(I am myself; I=I); antithesis: the Ego op-poses itself (non-I
is not myself; something exists which is not-I); synthesis:
(finite)Ego and (finite)non-Ego are both contained in the infinite
Ego. The second stage, the antithesis, corresponds to the
"world"; here we can see the influence of . Spinoza and we will
see something similar in Hegel.
This rather mysterious teaching is aimed at maintaining
the subjective consciousness as the starting point of our knowledge,
and from its existence positing the existence of the world. The
unity of self and world is found in the Absolute mind or subject.
It is not easy to see how he overcomes the problems Kant had
with the self-world relation; it seems that his problems are just
as severe , if not worse.
For descriptions. of his philosophy, see, for example, Collins
(History) and Copleston. For a good account of his writings
relate to Hegel's early philosophy, see Differenoepp. 32-39.
Again, Bonsiepen provides an insightful discussion on pp.
64-67. Kroner, 1,362-534, provides an extensive description
, of his philosophy and explicates the relation to Kant.
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3. Schelling: the philosophy of Identity. Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph von Schellidg (1775-1854) traversed no lessYbhan four
distinct (though cumulative) stages in his philosophy. Though
the other stages are also of considerable interest to scholars,
our main interest lieswith the third, his "Philosophy of
Identity." First propounded at length in 1803, this is basically
a reworked Spinozism. In contrast to Spinoza's dead, materialistic
determinism, Schelling proposed that neither a philosophy of
nature nor a philoeophy- of knowledge (mind) are adequate alone;
they need each other for completeness. He claimed that nature
and knowledge are bonded by reason in an undifferentiated identity.
Itself springing from the Absolute, Reason is the source of both
(external)nature; and (internal) knowledge. The supreme law
of reason is the law of

identity, AAA.

Thus, while some dist-

inctions are to be made regarding:form (e.g. subject-object),
the essence of all is an undifferentiated unity. (It was this
claim which led Hegel to remark tartly in the "Preface" to the
Phenomenology that this is "the night in which, as it is said,

all cows are black" [Phen 9/Phan 17)).
This leads to a vitalistic pantheism (influenced by Giordano
Bruno and others), where life is the principle of the inorganic
world. He held that we can distinguish God formally foom nature,
but not essentially. God cannot be understood rationally, because
God's essence is will which is evident only in his action.
Schelling's philosophy is similar to Fichte's in that he
is still operating with an Idealism which seeks to unite thought
and reality. But there is a major difference, in that Schelling
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placed the primary seat of reality outside the mind. For this
reason, Schelling is traditionally designated an "Objective
Idealist" and Fichte a "Sub4ective Idealist;?
The best general souwces are the same as for Fichte. Cerf's
innovative dialogue between Kant, Hegel, and Schelling in
Difference, pp. xxiv-xxxv,is very informative. See Rosen,
pp. 58-62 for a concise as helpful discussion. A magisterial
treatment is in Kroner(I,535-612 and II, 1-254).
E. Romanticism
There can be no doubt that Hegel's philosophical doctrines
were shaped by the romantic philosophies of this contemporaries,
but it is not so clear how-far their influence extends into his
philosophy. The very diversity of their ideals and the lack
of systematization which was characteristic of that movement
is also a serious reason why we shall have difficulty showing
their precise influence on Hegel. It is clear that he became
less "Romantic" as he matured, but there remained unmistakable
elements in his philosophy to his death. Our consideration of
their influence on Hegel's philosophy will fall under three
headings: the Greek Ideal, the revolt against mechanistic physics,
and the ideal of the hen kai pan.
A concise survey of the course of thought in the fifty
years prior to and including Hegel's youth, summarizing
the thought and relationships of Romantics to other movements, is in the first chapter of Taylor. (This is a
"must" for everyone- one reviewer enthusiastically remarked
that Hegel would have learned from itl) Chapter XVI of
Randall is very helpful in understanding the Romantic spirit.
Arthur 0. Lovejoy's classic includds a fine chapter (Ten)
on the principle of plenitpde in Romanticism.
1. The Hellenic Ideal. We are justified in referring to the
Hellenic Ideal for two reasons. (We are limiting the scope of
"Romanticism" and "Romantics" to the Germans roughly contemporaneous
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with Hegel.) This was an "ideal" in the sense that it was an
artificial reading of Greek culture. The Greek Ideal was deriveid
from exalted philosophical and literary works, not from study
of archaeology and works displaying the life of the.common man
(e.g., Hesiod). This was also an ideal in that the Romantics
believed that this "age of Pericles" is an ideal which transcends
time and is applicable for today.
There were two basic characterisations of the Greek man
which were common among the Romantics. Ole was that of the "New,
classical" harmonious man who lives within the limits set by the
gods. His life is dominated by sophrosy5, sober and harmonious
living. The other ideal was that of the "universal traveller,"
the free spirit whose mind ("genius") roams the range of reality
in order to experience life to the fullest. The second (which
is even more unreal than the first) overtook the first during
the period of Sturm and Drang

in the 1770's and dominated the

Romanticism which most 'influenced Ihigel.
In his earlier years (but not abandoned later) Hegel was
fond of comparing the Greek Volkareligion [people's religion]
with_ Christianity. He admired the Greek syncretistic attitude,
which incorporated the customs and religions of its constituent
peoples into its culture, and deprecated Christianity for arrogantly
banning native religions. (Note his well-known complaint;
"Christianity has depopulated Valhalla and destroyed the sacred
groves.") Though Hegel was always in favor of this syncretistic
view of religion, his gveater interest was that people be allowed
to remain in their indigenous religions (this is important, he
held, since he believed that native government and native religion
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belong together). Unlike many of his contamporaties, Hegel did
not find viable prospects for rebirth of Greek culture; he held
that it is impossible to retUrn to a revitalized Hellenic culture.
What we need to do, he claimed, is to learn to appropriate their
values and strengths as part of the present.
The final point of Hegel's Involvement With Greek culture
lies with the concept of the polls.

He believed that the reason

why Prussia had had such a iiserable history up to his time was
that there was too much individualism (fostered, he held, by
Rationalism, Pietism, and the Enlightenment). He held up the
Athens of Pericles as his model for a city in which the will of
the individual and the collective will of th city are the same.
In such an idyllic social climate, there will be cooperation
and unity which will certainly advance the progress of Spirit
in the World.
The classic work on this topic is Gray's. Gray works expertly
in the area and actually provides a rather good introduction
to Hegel's philosophy. Also very helpful are the first
chapter of Taylor and Plant (entire book; especially chapters
I, II, and VII) and Rosen, passim. The monograph:OfXkites does a
good job on Hegel's early conception of religion.
2. The attack on mechanistic physics. As we noted in the discussion
of Kant, his theory of knowledge is primarily devoted to an account
oChOW the newborn science of physics can be preserved from
destruction by the monster of skepticism. The appearance of
Newton's 1Principla in 1687 marked the terminus a quo for an

age of mechanistic science, particularly physics. The Newtonian
physics is characterized by the working of laws which are innately
contained in the universe, requiring no external (divine) acts
of preservation to preserve them. The result of the new mechanistic physics was widespread, influencing anthropology and
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social theory to a radical extent.
The Romantics were unified in their disdain for mechanism.
They wanted desperately to grasp the unity of the universe as
an organic, living being (this is also an early Greek notion).
They demanded a re4urn to their Greek ideals, man living in
nature as part of nature, united with it as part of a cosmic
life-force.
Randall chapter XI is a good account of the new kechanism.
Again, the first chapter of Taylor is good.
3. the hen kai

En.

This expression from Leasing expresses the

desire of the Romantics to unite reality. Though Leasing was
certainly more in the Enlightenment tradition, his Spinozistic
desire to unify all into a unity of substance (pantheism) does
sound a bugle call to'the Romantics.
For the purposes of this study, we may simplify the aims
of the Romantics into four main desires (profiting from the
analysis of Taylor, chapter one). The first desire of the
Romantics was to unify anthropology, which the Enlightenment had
dissected. The second desire was to propose a novel view of
freedom. ' The Enlightenment saw freedom as the absence of
oppression from the state and church, but the Romantics viewed
freedom in terms of the free expressiveness of the individual
person. The third was a call for unity with nature, to find the
community of the human spirit with the spirit of life in nature.
This found several expressions, all amounting to an exaltation
of "feeling" [Gefdhl]; typical is Schiller's famous Lied an
die Freude [Ode to Joy). Used by Beethoven in his Ninth (Choral)

Symphony, Schiller in this poen) refers to "joy" as the "magic
which binds back together what custom boldly divides" and in
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numerous ways expresses the hen kai pan

theme. The fourth goal

was to find community with other people on the basis of community
with nature, in a polls-like unity.
Hence our characterization of this goal as the hen kai pan,
the one and the all. Remembering our initial analysis of the
Enlightenment, that they struggled with- the problems of individuality and science, we see that the Romantics struggled with
same problems but reached quite different answers from the Enlightenment. Hegel does fall heir to some Enlightenment (principally
as he used and altered the philosophical tendencies of Kant and
his successors), but on the whole he is far more sympathetic with
Romantic ideals. We will not be far off base, for example, if
we characterize his famous Phenomenology of Spirit as the
struggle for the individual consciousness (the one) to find its
place in what lies outside it (the all).
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Notes to Chapter One
1
I cannot agree with Findlay's opinion that Hegel's philosophy
was "autochthonous growth, begotten more out of his own personal
broodings over the mysteries of Christianity and on the strange
arguments of the Platonic Parmenides, than from the philosophers
who went before him in time"(article "Hegel" in O'Connor, Critical
History, page 322). Actually,Hegel was perhaps the most historyconscious of all philosophers. Findlay's remark (indeed this article)
is sadly below the level of his usual fine scholarship; his writing
and the nature of his'historical studies show us that he does not
really believe this.
2For Hegel's own discussions of these thinkers, consult the three
volume Vorlesungen Ober die Geschichte der Philosophie [Lectures
on the History of Philosophy].

3 This is a good approach to understanding Hegel's philosophical
enterprise in general. It is used by Rosen (5ff.), Gadamer (7f,
33, 58), and Kroner II, 255, with considerable success.
4Jones, p.21.
5Kainz, Commentary, page7.
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Chapter Two: Hegel°s Philosophical Enterprise

We are now ready to investigate the Hegelian system itself.
We begin this chapter with a biographical sketch, including notes
on his writings, and devote the remainder of the chapter to a
discussion of the nature of his writings.
A. Hegel's life and writings .
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was born in Stuttgart. He was sent to the local

school at the age of three

and the Latin school at age five; at the age of ten he went to the
excellent local Gymnasium.

In the winter of 1788-89 he began

study at the Tdbingen stift (theological "foundation"; roughly
equivalent to a seminary). Sharing a room with Wilderlin and
Schelling, he declared his chief areas of study to be philosophy
and theology. Though his lifestyle was rather "free" (he enjoyed
drinking wine and playing cards at the local cafes somewhat to
excess), he was a gifted student who stayed at or near the top of
his class. Upon the passing of his examination in theology in 1793,
(Switzerland)

he went to Berne4 as a private tutor in accord with the custom of
his day. As was also the custom, he used his private time to read
and develop his.own thoughts. In 1797 he took a more appealing
position in Frankfurt (where his friends were). This was a period
of intense questioning for Hegel, and he wfote numerous essays
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in his private journal which were published by Hermann Nohl in
1907 under the title Hegels theologische

Juggndsichriftes.

Though

several essays are fragmentary and all are from a young and tender
mind, they are quite helpful in better understanding the later Hegel.
Some of these essays will be examined in Chapter Five.
In 1801 he accepted a position at the University of Jena as
an unsalaried lecturer (as a

privatdotent

he would be paid by the

individual students on a per-lecture basis). There he collaborated
with Schelling for ak_couple of years on the Kritisches Journal.
He published his first book of any sort in 1801(the so-called
(Phanomenologie des Geistes)

Differenzschrift), but his first major workAdid npt appear until
1807. This work was written hurriedly in 1806 while Napoleon
was besieging the city; Hegel escaped the looting troops .with the
last part of the manuscript in his pocket.
Desperately needing a job, he accepted the editorship of
a newspaper

(Die Bamberger Zeitung).

There at Bamberg he was

able to keep up with the details of world events, in keeping with
his desire to be.yell-informed regarding the progress of Spirit
in the world. Finally bored with his position to the point of
desperation, he pleaded with his friend Niethammer to find him a
different job. Being the senior inspector of the public sciools,
Niethammer had him placed in Nurenberg as head-master of the
Gymnasium (1808). Though the multitude of duties was #ppressitioe,
Hegel did find time to get married in 1811 (he was 41; his bride
Marie was 20) and begin publication of his next work. This was
the ponderous

Wissenschaft der

Logik (Science of Logic)(Book One,

1812, Book Two, 1813, Book Three, 1816; Book One substatially
revised, 1831). He was blessed with a fine and happy family life
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to the end of his days, having two sons who distinguished themselves
professionally. They also had a daughter who died in infancy and
there was

the illegitimate son Ludwig, born in 1807 in Jena

to the wife of Hegel's landlord.
In 1816 Hegel finally received an invitation to teach at the
University of Heidelberg. While there he published his EnzyklopUdie
der philosophischen Wissenschaftan in Grundrisse [Encyclopedia of
the Philosophical Sciences in Outline] in 1817, and his reputation

grew steadily. In 1818 he was asked to teach at the University
of Berlin, to replace the famous Fichte who had been gone for
several years. (His famous conflict with Schleiermacher, then
Rector (President) of the University, began immediately but did
not escalate to seriousness until 1820.) While at Berlin he became
the most important philosopher in Europe and was considered such
until a few years after his death. In 1821 he finished his
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [Basis of the Philosophy of
Law], a description of the proper functioCing and theoretical

foundations of the. State.
While at Berlin he was asked to fill numerous official posts
and found himself quite busy with activities other than teaching,
including election to the post of Rector

in 1829.

He died in 1831 after a very brief illness, traditionally classed
as cholera, but this is by no means certain.
Hegel published only four major works during his lifetime:
Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic, Encyclopedia, Philosophy of Right.

But there are literally bushels of notes from his

lectures which have been published. The two editions published
by his !friends and students (1832 and 1841) also cantkin lecture
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series on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of religion,
the history of philosophy, and aesthetics. There remain bushels
more of letters, notes, notebooks, and such which are invaluable
to serious researchers. Much already is published piecemeal, but
are now being published in a continuous text-critical edition
by Felix Meiner Verlag in a planned set of 36 volumes.
Most introductions of any size offer a worthwhile introduction
to Hegel's life and works. Franz Wiedmann's little Hegel is
a delightful introduction to his life, times, and works which
has no equal. He provides a sane and basically neutral
account of the events which are considered controversial.
Unfdrtunately, the fine bibliography and multitgde of fascinating pictures which grace the German edition has been
decimated in the English edition.
The more detailed biographies in English are those by
Mueller and Kaufmann. Both are essentially accurate regarding
facts, but need to be used critically. Kaufmann's work,
like his book on Nietzsche, is more noteworthy for its polemic
and literary discussion than for any phil aophical erudition.
Kaufmann spends too much energy proving theses already known
and accepted (e.g., the conclusion of Haering that Schiller
was an important influence on the young Hegel) and not enough
energy elucidating Hegel's philosophy. He sees Hegel as
decidedly anti-Christian, which is simply not true to the
extent which Kaufmann claims (Kaufmann was more anti-Christian
thah Hegel). Kaufmann's dislike for Hegel is quite apparent ,
and on the whole his book is not all that useful for someone
trying to get his bearings in Hegel. Overall, this book is
edifying after some other reading has been done, but is not
a good place to start.
Mueller is sympathetic with Hegel, but the English version
of his work is but a pale shadow of the German original.
Though enlightening, it is helpful more as an intermediate
discussion than as a beginning resource. Reviews of these
books are to be found in Weiss' "Critical Survey° article
in O'Malley, The Legacy of Hegel. On the whole, these
works should be used after a basic acquaintance with the
Hegelian system has been achieved from more even-tempered
and reliable sources such as those by Wiedmann, Taylor, Rosen,
and Collins.
Of the technical biographies we mention the main ones:
Rosenkranz, Haym, Fischer, Haering, and Glockner. Karl
Rosenkranz was a disciple of Hegel and is considered a very
reliable source for information about Hegel's life and thought
because he was not strongly associated with either the "left"
or the "right" wing Hegelians. (Right wing Hegelians were
theologically and politically conservative; Most left wing
Hegelians were atheists an/or Marxists.) His Georg Wilhelm
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Friedrich Hegels Leben (1844) is still a staple for research.
Rudolf Haym's Hegel and sein Zeit (1857) is important, but
Haym did maliciously alter and delete some facts and materials.
The Hegels Leben, Werke, end Lehre of Kuno Fischer gives the
perspective of a Right Hegelian. The painstaking researches
of Theodor Haering (1929-38) and Hermann Glockner (1929-40)
are scientific and immensely thorough and helpful.

B. Synoptic overview of Hegel-'s metaphysics
Difficult though it is to briefly summarize Hegel's thought,
the practical worth of this survey will depend on the reader's
initial grasp of Hegel's system. In order to do this efficently,
we will limit our consideration to the skeleton of his system,
his logic/metaphysics (which are the same thing for him). Such
a summary is best made by taking two complementary points of view
first, the trans-human (if we use the term divine this will only
be confusing later)and then, the human perspective.
Seen from a trans-human perspective, that of what he would
call logic (or, he would also say, theo-logic), we can trace the
same movement in two ways. Logically, cosmic or "universal" histopy
consists in a movement from the most general (and empty, as we
noted from Spinoza) to the most particular, and then to a unity
of the two. Since the universal concept is indeterminate it is
without content, it is incomplete and strives for completion.
This completion can come only in "knowing" the content which it
lacks. This striving is not because of any conscious desire (the
universal concept has no consciousness of its own), but because
it is logically necessary that everything incomplete find completion.
(These rather confusing axioms will be described and explained in
Chapter Fear.) The upshot of this is that the Universal strives
to know itself through Particulars which are implicit in it.
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Since both are one-sided, the universal without content and the
particular without form (since it is a multitude of singulars
unrelated to a universal), the unity of the universal and particular
seeks to find itself. From a logical point of view, this conjunction
of the universal (the major premiss) and the particular (the minor
premiss) seeks a conclusion. All this will be clearer after
discussing the other elements which form part of his system.
The other part of this trans-human viewpoint is what Hegel
refers to as the divine. Hegel's use of this approach is easier
to grasp because his language and concepts are simpler and more
familiar, but yet it is much more difficult because what he means
by . God and divine are not at all what is usually meant. Nonetheless,
this approach from the side of theological language is helpful to
us. Hegel uses the language of the Christian Trinity, stating
that the Universal which existed 'before" the world is the Father,
the Father alienated part of himself from himself, which is 'the
world (the kingdom of the Son, who emptied himself), and the path
of return is that of the Spirit, who unites Father and Son.
In the third age, that of Spirit (Geist; note that the German
for Holy Spirit is Ileilige Geist), the universal and the particular
are united in the community. It may be helpful to note a similar
train of thought on the part of the Modal Monarchians, who claimed
that the Godhead exists in three discrete modes such that when the
Father existed, the Son and Spirit did not, and when the Son existed,
the Father and the Spirit did not, etc. So far as I can tell, this
parallel with Hegel's thought is unintentional, and it is not an
exact parallel, but still it is close enough for helpful comparison.
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of a contentless universal concept from being "in-itself" to a
state of self-alienation, where it is broken into itself and its
other. Having come to know itself in its other (not unlike knowing
oneself in a mirror image), there is then the return back to. itself
as Spirit living in human consciousnesses and unifying itself.
In Hegel's scheme of things, these three steps (alienation, selfknowledge, unification) correspond to his interpretation of the
Christian story of creation, redemption, and sanctification.
From the human point of view, the Hegelian philosophy is the
striving of Spirit to return tQ its original oneness. Since the
original (and the later forms of) Concept is not conscious, it
gains consciousness only in the self-consciousnessAonly in the
human consciousness. Perhaps the axiom which is most helpful
overall in understanding the Hegelian philsophy is his claim,
"Das Wahre 1st das Ganze"([The True is the Whole] Phen 11/Phan 19).

This has several implications. First, the partial is false.
Second, since rationality is a uniquely human feature, our search
for truth implies that we will be thinking the whole. Ultimately,
the whole is to be found only in the final reunion of Universality
and Particularity (God and the World, in his peculiar language)
as a completed Whole, where the Universal knows itself as Particular
content and is thus a balanced whole.
I believe that there are three most basic principles which
underlje the Hegelian system, and that these principles must be
clearly understood before the system can be understood at all.
The first, and.the most basics is his desire for balanced
completeness. Reminiscent of Plato's compasive desire for unity,

-34-

Hegel insists that his philosophy begin with and return to a
balanced completion.
The second principle, inherited from Spinoza, is that negativity is the foundation upon which all reality is built. The
contradictory, negative nature of everything having real existence
dictates that nothing can be static. There is a ceaseless passing
into opposites, moving back and forth from one (conceptual)position to an opposite which was implicit in the first.
But what keeps this shifting mass of contradiction from
sheer chaos? What makes it intelligible? The answer to both
ggestions is the third principle, immanent teleology. Inherited
from Aristotle, Hegel's teleology dictates that from beginning to
end (this is already telic language) there is a rationally
intelligible purpose which is being acted out in existence. This
teleology is immanent in the structure of what is, it is a logical
and rational movement. Does this allow us to predict future events?
Hegel would say, yes and no. We do know that the end of reality
is one of balanced wholeness which is rationally intelligible, and
in this sense we know the future. But since the true is the whole,
we are not licensed to predict individual events; they are only
part of the picture and do not accurately reflect any balanced
state of affairs. We cannot expect that any individuals will
necessarily obey the rational teleology, but we know that the
overall progress will be positive (Hegel calls this the "Cunning
of Reason" [Die List der vernunft].
Really worthwhile summaries of Hegel's philosophy are surprisingly rare. The treatments of Gray (the Introduction
to the excellent G.W.F. Hegel On Art,Religion, Philsophy)
and Findlay (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, sub "Hegel") are
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concise and helpful. Ideally, one should read as many
summaries and introductions as possible and check them against
the texts and against each other. This is more necessary
in the case of Hegel research than in most other beginning
philosophy studies, because there is simply no brief and
satisfactorily lucid introduction to his philosophy (with
the possible exception of Collins, History).
The treatments of Findlay (Reexamination), Rosen,
Taylor, and Collins (History) are the plumb-lines by which
the others can be measured. For first-hand acquaintance,
the beginning reader will best get. hold of all three parts of
the Encyclopedia and page through it. The presentation which
was given in the text above is uniquely my own, and I believe
that it singles out some key points frequently passed over
in the majority of summaries.
C. The character of Hegel's philosophizing
1. His style. Hegel's written style is notoriously difficult.
Bloch puts it well:"Hegel is difficult, there is no doubt; he is
one of the most inconvenient [unbeguemsten] among the greatest
thinkers. Many of his sentences are like vessels filled with
the strongest and most fiery drink, but the vessels have only very
small handles or none at all. Also, there are copious transgressions
against civil grammar which strike not merely against the linguistic
purist, hnd sometimes right on the head" (Subjekt-Objekt, p.18).
We know that Hegel (like Kant, whose formal style is not much
better) was able to write clearly when he wanted to do so. Some
commentators are bitterly critical of Hegel's style (e.g. Mueller,
who calls the Phenomenology a "pitiful heap of unintelligible
gibberish" (p.2071), while others are more sympathetic. Bloch
defends Hegel bravely, holding that Hegel was trying to say in
ordinary language what is impossible to adequately express in any
language. He claims (and rightly so) that Hegel is in fact using
many languages at once (pp. 19-20),but perhaps Bloch defends the
vagaries of Hegel's style too much. A certain amount of the
murkiness is certainly caused by the extreme haste with which the
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discuss other views, such as that of Kaufmann, within this study.
Suffice it to say that Hegelas style is extremely difficult, but
this is mostly by choice as he strives to express a new system in
old words (and barbarous combinations thereof).
The discussions of Bloch (pp. 18-21), Kaufmann (pp. 115-138),
and Mueller (p. 207 and passim) are interesting but all inferior to the excellent treatment by Cook, Chapter IX.
2. Hegel's attitude towards prior thinkers. In keeping with his
dictum that the true is the whole, Hegel believed that philosophy
does not sort and discard ideas. All prior thoughts are legitimately
part of the Whole which alone is true. Those thoughts which are
ordinarily (or technically) considered "false are actually legitimate parts of the Whole, no less than "true" ones, because they
all contribute to the fullness of reality. Much like Aristotle,
Hegel believed that the work of his predecessors is incomplete
but important prolegomena to his own philosophizing. He says this
clearly in the opening paragraphs of the Phenomenology of Sp&rit:
The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis
of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given
philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted,
and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does
not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the
progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple
disagreements.2
I am partial to viewing Hegel's way of doing philosophy
as similar to the way an experienced editor operates with a
staff of bungling cub reporters. That is, Hegel found it
necessary to use the material which was given him, but with
the constant need for revision and rearrangement. Thus his
philosophical system is his own, but i. is composed principally
of materials gathered by his predecessors and contemporaries.
Cf. Gray, Hegel's Hellenic Ideal, pp. 68ff.
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Notes to Chapter Two
1Regarding the Science of Logic, Hegel wrote the following to
his friend Niethammer:"It is no small task to write a 500 page
book in the first semester of one's marriage.--But injuria temporuml
I am no academic; reaching proper form would have taken me another
year, and I need money now to live on" (Briefe I, p.393, translation
mine ).
2Phenomenology p.2; Phanomeno1ogie p.10:"SO fest der Meynung der
Gegensatz des Wahren und Falschen wird, so pflegt sid auch entweder Seystimmung oder Widerspruch gegen ein vorhandenes
sophisches System zu erwarten, und in einer ErklArung fiber ein
solches nur entweder das eine oder das andre zu sehen. Sie
begreifftLdie Verschiedenheit philosophischer Systeme nicht so
sehr als die f4schreitende Entwiklung der Wahrheit, als sie
in der Verschiedenheit nur den Widerspruch sieht."
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Chapter Three: The Absolute as Spirit

"The Absolute is spirit; this is the supreme definition of

the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its significance
and content was, one may say, the ultimate purpose of all education
and all philosophy." Here we have a central concept in Hegel's
philosophy, that the ultimate basis of reality is Spirit.
This

chapter is to be an explanation of the implications of

this claim.
A. Hegel's predecessors on the Absolute
We are, of necessity, limiting this discussion of the Absolute
to Hegel's immediate predecessors: Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, and
Schelling. These four are divisible, for our purposes, into two
pairs: Spinoza and Schelling; Kant and Fichte.
1. Spinoza and Schelling: The Absolute as Substance. We recall
from Chapter One that Spinoza claimed that God is the same as Nature,
and that this is again equivalent to infinite substance. What most
people found shocking, and what Hegel found untenable in this
position, is the fact that substance is ordinarily associated
with dead, inert matter. Though this is not quite what Spinoza
intended, certainly his detemministic world held no attraction
for Hegel. We recall that Schelling posited (in his third period
of thought) a common source for nature and knowledge, namely reason.
In his earlier (second) period he had espoused (and never repudiated)
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the further claim that nature is superior to mind, and wart the
mind knows it receives from nature. This is claiming that the
basis for reality is actually nature(which is itself from reason),
and that the knowledge which we have of nature is a result of
reason. Thus both Spinoza and Schelling held that nature (as
substance) is the prime source of reality. Hegel repudiates this
approach, holding that the Absolute is not only substance, or
principle, but is also subject.
2. Kant and Fichte: The Absolute as Subject. Kant and his
disciple Fichte both claimed that the knowing subject is most
basic in reality. Kant modestly left the subject primarily in
the human consciousness, subjugating all knowledge to its formative
influence. Fichte went further, making the Ego the cosmic ground
of existence. Hegel was not content with this approach, either,
since claiming that the Absolute is subject leaves many unanswered
questions regarding the relation of the (mental)subdect to
(physical)reality.
The most helpful discussions of this are in Collins, History,
and Rotenstreich, Chapters one and two.
S. Hegel: the Absolute as Spirit
1• The ambiguity of

Geist. A long-standing disagreement among

Hegel scholars concerns the "proper" translation of the word Geist.
Sometimes it signifies the individual human mind (in which Geist
comes to consciousness), and sometimes it signifies universal
Spirit in the world. At times he intends both meanings, but usually
he is emphasizing one or the other. While Mind is important in
Hegel's philosophy, it conjures up too many reminders of the Neo-
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hand, is easily applied to the "human spirit," the "spirit of
an age," and the Holy Spirit-- all very important aspects of Geist
for Hegel. 11
There is some important literature on this matter. An important discussion of this and °thee difficult terms is recorded
in Kainz' article "Roundtable" (in O'Malley, Legacy).
Robert Solomon's important article, reprinted in Macintyre,
is helpful on a deeper level. We see another instance of
Kaufmann's careless impatience as he hastily dismisses the
"Mind" translati,n without considering its merits (p.160).
2. The reflective unity of Substance and Subject. The Absolute
is Spirit. Spirit, for Hegel, includes both substance and subject;
these tug aspects are indicated by the alternative translations
Spirit and Mind (respectively). The absolute substance, the
ground of all, is also spirit. How can these two, subbstance
(which undergoes the dialectical changes of generation and corruption) and subject (characterized by intuitive immediacy) be
unified? Hegel believes that the act of reflection captures
both of these aspects. Reflection of the intellect thrives on
the dialectic of opposites, such s is present in generation and
corruption, and reflection may also refer to the return of the
substance to itself. Thus Mind (human and "cosmic") reflects
on itself, knowing itself intuitively and also dialectically.2
This is not the easiest to understand, but it is very important.
Hegel's vision is certainly profound, uniting subjective thought
with objective substance under the aegis of reason. The rationally reflective subject is automatically reflecting on something.
It is Vital that this point be understood, for, like Plato,
Hegel is adamant in insisting that ultimate reality is rationally
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knowable. Though the term "reason" can be confusing as Hegel
uses it, Hegel insists that "the true is the rational."3
Most helpful on this matter are Collins, History, and
Rotenstreich.
3• The Absolute as Systematic Science. Absolute Mind/Spirit

finds its perfect embodiment in Science. Again, "Science" is
not the modern empirical science but the ancient conception of
scientia, absolutely true knowledge. The redundant modifiers

"systematic" and " philosophical" are sometimes added to emphasize
the fact that this is ultimate wisdom.
"that the True is actual only as System, or that the Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the mental image
of the Absolute as spirit--the most exalted Concept and that which
belongs to the modern age and its religion."4 Substance and
Subject age fully united into a balanced whole only in the
systematically whole philosophy. The form of philosophy, the
logical categories of a thinking subject, becomes identical with
the substance of reality, which is the content of philosophy.
The term "actual" is the operative element in the passage above,
and this term will be explained in Chapter Four below. Here we
will note the conclusion that the True is completed, or properly
balanced, only in a System which encompasses all reality.
One implication, noted above, of this notion of the "systematic
whole" is that the form and the content of philosophy become identical. The very expression "Absolute" implies that this is the
all-inclusive category, and the most basic and pervasive of all
categories. Hut the Absolute (Mind/Spirit) not only has form
and content, it is an identity of form and content. Put in other
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words, logic and metaphysics are the same. Metaphysics, the science
of substance, and logic, the 'science of the thinking subject,
are reflectively iddntical in Absolute Mind/Spirit. "[The developmental stages of Spirit] no longer fall apart into the opposition
of Being and Knowing, but abide in the simple unity of Knowing.
They are the True in the form of the True, and their difference
is merely the difference of co tent. Their movement, which organizes itself in this element into the Whole, is the Lbgic or the
Speculative Philosophy."5
The best source for this information is the Preface ',to the
Phenomenology. On an advanced level, the expositions by
Glockner (p.135ff.) and Hinrichs (Chapter VIII,"Das absolute
Wissen") are superb.
C. The road to Spirit
1. The problem of an introduction. The expositor of Hegel faces
the same problem as Hegel himself faced: where do we start? Since
truth resides only in the finished whole, there is no "true proposition" with which we can make a beginning. Either we cannot
start at all, which is absurd, or we can start anywhere. The latter
is the case, and it is the person learning who decides where to
shows
start: "In this way philosophyA itself to be a circle which goes
back into itself, which has no beginning as in the sense which
other Sciences have, so that the beginning has a connection only
to the subject who resolves to philosophize, not to the Science
as Science." The start with the "person" is precisely that of the
Phenomenology of Spirit.
An extremely helpful discussion of the problem of a beginning
is to be found in Hyppolyte, pp. 4-11. Hegel presents a
more technical treatment of this problem in the Science of
Logic, pp.67-78/ Wissenechaft der Logik I, pp. 51-64.
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2. Universal education: Remembering in Experience. What is the
process whereby one learns the ultimate scicnce? This is a
major problem which faced Hegel. His anewer is not one Which is
particularly simple, but it is profound and very important to his
philosophical system.
As we will see more fully in the discussion of dialectic
(Chapter Four below),' Hegel claimed that the course of cosmic
history has passed from the (empty, cententless) universal into
its opposite, (mere confused) particularity, and the unity of
the two one-sided parts into the synthesis of each into the
(balanced, "actual") individual. Individuality, for Hegel, is
always the unity of universal (objective) and particular (subjective) into a balanced whole. The (metaphorical) explanation
which Hegel gives is that the empty universal must discover the
particular content which is implicitly its own. The logical explanation is that every concept implies a contradictory concept
which must be explicated before the first is fully understood.
In order to know its implicit content, the universal becomes the
implicit particulars and observes itself in the human mind (subject)
which lives in the human body and the physical world (substance).
As the human consciousness understands the world, this is also
the Spirit educating itself. The result of this observation of
the world is the reflective reunification of the Substance and the
Subject in Speculative Science.
From this general account, we are ready to flesh out some
details. There are two concepts which are central to properly
understanding his accounts
and Experience [srfahrung].

anamnesis

["remembering,"

Erinnerung]
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As we noted from the historical survey of Plato's influence

on Hegel, Plato's doctrine of anamnesis (that the eternal soul in
each successive human life retains the memory of what was learned
in the previous lives) finds a new life in Hegel. "Although9 from
one point of view, the first appearance of the new world is only
at first the Whole veiled in its Unity, or is its universal foundation, yet the richness of previous existence is present to
consciousness in memory [Brinnerung].

The notion that individuals

are contributing to the overall "education" of Spirit (since the
wisdom of Spirit cumulates with the passage of historic 1 events)
is a concept sometimes given the precise formulation "transcendental
propaedeutic."
We have discussed the "remembering" and its cumulative action,
now we can see how this amounts to "education." Hegel writes:
"The series oitghapes„ which the consciousness passes through
along this path, is rather the comprehensive history of the
education [Bildung; also "culture") of consciousness itself to

[the goal of] Science,"8 We cannot stop to discuss the similarities
of this approach to the then contemporary literary ge*re of
Bildungsroman (or Ersiehungsroman) [culture/education-novel] as

exePlified by Goethe's

Meister wilheims Lehrjahre. 9

What matters

here is that Spirit is educating itself in the observation of
the world.
Hegel's very word for "experience" is instructive. The
German word Brfahrung

contains the concept of "journey," while

the synonymn Brlebnis emphasizes the inner subjective quality of
"experience.° Thus, we would refer to events in life as part of
Erfahrung

and an emotional experience as BrIebnis.

We can note
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with interest that Hegel's emphasis is betrayed by the fact that
Gauvin's Wortindex gives about 150 instances of forms of Erfahrung,
in the Phenomenology, while only two instances of erleben

occur

in the entire work.
From our explanation of how Aristotle influenced Hegel's
philosophy, we concluded that the Aristotelian notion of Science
as composed of chains of syllogisms is the root of Hegel's concept
of experience. Again, Aristotle starts with a definition which is
general and to which is added a particular observation which forms
the "middle term" upon which the conclusion is based. The ideal
instance of this is the "Barbara" mood, which follows the form
"All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal."
For Hegel, the logical (universal, objective) seeks particular
observations which can serve as the mediating "middle term" to
balance itself. When the universal finds the (subjective)
particulars it logically requires, the resulting balanced conclusion
is only the basis for further discovery. Thus the concept of
experience, for Hegel, follows the linking together of knowledge
discussed by Aristotle. "This

dialectical

movement, which conscious-

ness exercises on itself, regarding both its knowledge and its
object

(insofar as the new true object springs out

of it), is

properly [uniquely]that what is named experience."10
In brief, we can describe the universal education of Spirit

as the process by which Absolute Mind/Spirit finds its balancing
truth in the [philosophical] observation of itself as substance
in particulars. This filling of the universal with observed
particulars is precisely the return of Spirit to itself.
pp. 613ff.
Collins (History) and Findlay (Re-Examinatiodo pp. 85ff., will
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topic is Heidegger's famous essay, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung."
Also helifful are Blbch, pp. 473ff., on anamnesis, and Puntel,
pp. 287ff., "Die Erfahrung als dialektische Bewegung."

-47Notes to Chapter Three
1My translation; Enzyklopadie sect. 384:"Das Absolute ist der
Geist; dies ist die h8chste Definition des Absoluten.--Diese
Definition zu finden und ihren Sinn und Inhalt zu begreifen,
kann mann sagen, war die absolute Tendenz aller Bildung und
Philosophie..."
2This point is made in Phenomenology, p.21 (Philnomenologie pp.
29-30):"Now, though this negative appears at first as a disparity
between the "I" and its object, it is lust as much the disparity
of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside
itself, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own
doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When
it has shown this completely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is,
and the abstract element of immediacy, and of the separation of
knowing andltruth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated;
it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the
property of the "I", it is the self-like or the Concept." (Translation modified.)
3The problem, as we will see in Chapter Four, is in the definition
of "rational." Kroner, from a perfectly valid perspective, is
also justified in his judgment,"Hegel ist ohne Zweife1,41er grOsste
Irrationalist, den die Geschichte der Philosophie kennt"[Hegel is,
without doubt, the greatest irrationalist which the history of
philosophy knows.] (11,271). Kroner's entire discussion (11,267272) is very helpful.
4 My translation; Phenomenology p.14. Phanomenologie p.22:"Dass
das Wahre nur als System wirklich, oder dass die Substanz wesentlich
Subject ist, ist in der Vorstellung ausgedkt, welche das Absolute
als Geist ausspricht,--der erhabenste Begriff, und der der neuern
Zeit und ihrer Religion angeh8rt."
The reader probably wonders by now why I take so many examples
from the beginning of the Phenomenology. I do so because the Vorrede
[Preface] and the Einleitung [Introduction] to the Phenomenology
are dofisidered to be classic introductions to his philosophy.
Hopefully, repeated use of examples from these sections will
encourage readers to feel some impetus to read and study these
sections for themselves.
5My translation; Phenomenology p.22. PhAnomenologie p.30:"Sie
fallen nicht mehr in den Gegensatz des Seyns und Wissens auseinander, sondern bleiben in der Einfachheit des Wissens, sind das
Wahre in der Form des Wahren, und ihre Verschiedenheit ist nur
Versbhiedenheit ist nur VershCedenheit des Inhalts. Ihre Bewegung,
die sich in diesem Elemente zum Ganzen orgafiisirt, ist die
Logik oder speculative Philosophie." Similar statements abound
in Hegel's writings. (The German texts sometimes space for emphasis
and sometimes use italics. We will adopt the policy in cppying
the quotations to use italics whenever emphasis is indizcated.)
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6 My translation; EnzyklopAdie sect. 17:"Auf diese Weise zeigt
sich die Philosophie als ein in sich zurOckgehender Kreis, der
keinen Anfang nur eine Beziehung auf das Subjekt, als welched
sich entschliessen will zu philosophieren, nicht auf die Wissenschaft als solche hat."

7My translation; Phenomenology 7. PhAnomenologie p./5:"Indem
einerseits die erste Erscheinung der neuen Welt nur erst das in
eine Einfachheit verhullte Ganze oder sein Grund ist, so ist dem
Bewusstsein dagegen der Reichthum des vorhergehenden Daseyns
noch in der Erinnerung gegenwArtig."

8 My translation; Phenomenology p. 50. Phanomenologie p.56:"Die
Reihe seiner Gestaltungen, selche das Bewusstseyn auf diesem
Wege durchldufft, ist vielmehr die ausftrliche Geschichte der
Bildung des Bewusstseyns selbst zur Wissenschaft." (See also
Phenomenology, sections 28 and 70.)

9See, for example, Kaufmann, page 158.
1°My translation; Phenomenology.p.55. Phanomenologie p. 60:"Diese
dialektische Bewegung, welche das Bewusstseyn an ihm selbst,
sowohl an seinem Wissen als an seinem Gegenstande austibt, in
sofern ihm der neue wahre Gegenstand daraus entspringt, ist
eigentlich dasjenige, was Erfahrung genannt wird."

11As further evidence of the many-sided character of the word
Geist, witness the meanings given by Johannes Hoffmeister in
his Worterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, Zweite Auflage
(Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1955) sub"Geist": Luft, Hauch, Aether
als unsichtbare Substanz [air, breeze, aether as invisible
substance]; das Lebensprinzip selbst [the very principle of
life]; angels, demons, etc.; weltgeist [the (impersonal) spirit
of the world; der Heilige Geist [the Holy Spirit];der menschli6he
Verstand [human intellect]; die menschlich schbpferische Intelligenz
[human creative intelligence]; "the spirit of" a time, nation,
person, etc.
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Chapter Four: The Hegelian Dialectic

Hegel's dialectic is the best-known feature of his system,
and rightly so. Dialectic is his method, the moving force which
makes th4system go. The dialectic is a formidible (more like
"impassable") barrier to understanding his kystem unless it is
explained in detail. In the previous three chapters we have seen
the elements which feed into the workings of his dialectic, and
now we are ready to put the pieces together.
Hegel discusses two dialectics, one "false" lbecause it is
partial) and the other "true" (because it thinks the Whole).
The first is that of Understanding [verstand] and the second that
of (Speculative) Reason (vernunft].
A. The dialectic of Understanding
"In mathematical cognition insight is an activity which
is external to the main point (Sache has the connotation of
essence for Hegel]; from this it follows that the true thing
is altered by it. The means, construction and proof, indeed
contain true propositions, but nonetheless it must be said
that the content is false."1
The reasoning power of the faculty of Understanding is limited
to our ordinary logical methodology, and as such is "false."
This dialectical movement is limited to consideration of opposites
without the realization of how to unify them. As he admits above,
the propositions themselves may be true, but when one is finished
with theiproper procedures there remains only a mass of one-sided

-50-

claims.
"This formalism...imagines that it has comprehended and
expressed the nature and life of a form when it has endowed
it with the same determination of the schema as a predicate.
The predicate may be subjectivity or objectivity, or, say,
magnetism, electricity, etc., contraction or expansion, east
or west, and the like. Such predicates can be multiplied to
infinity, since in this way each determination or form can
again be used as a form or moment in the other, and each can
gratefully perform the same service for an other. In this
sort of circle of reciprocity [ein cirkel von Gegenseitigkeit]
one never learns what the thing itself (die Bache selbst] is,
nor what the one or the other is."2
The pedestrian multiplication of one-sided predicates is now
Hegel characterizes all thought which has passed for logic and
philosophylbefore his time.3
The conceptions of philosophy as circular and infinite are
very important to Hegel. He views the kind of philosophizing
which has gone before him (all examples of the dialectic of
Understanding) to be examples of bad circularity and bad infinity.
For Hegel, "bad" circularity is the endless motion from point to
point without going anywhere new. Likewise with "bad" infinity,
which is ceaseless passing from opposite to opposite without
reaching completion. For the Absolute to be infinite and circular in a "good" sense, there must be an upwards spiraling as
well.
"But sunk into the material and advancing in its movement,
(scientific cognition) returns to itself, but not before its
filling or content is taken back to itself, is Simplified to
the point of determinateness, has reduced itself to one side
of its existence, and has passed over into its higher truth
[seine h8here Wahrheit]. On this basis emerges the simple,
self-overseeing whole itself out of the wealth in which
its reflection appeared to be lost."
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The distinction between the dialectics of Verstand and
Vernunft is so basic that discussions can be found in nearly
any introduction. A basic presentation (though rather
pedestrian and not altogether lucid) is given by Nancy Sherman
in Kant-Studien 71,2(1980)238-253. Particularly helpful on
a deeper level are Bloch (pp.121ff.) and Eric Weil .in O'Malley,
Legacy.

B. The dialectic of Reason
The dialectic of Understanding is stuck on the level of
simple oppositions, or as he also says, mere negations. Negativity
is the basic feature of existing things, but it is not sufficent
to remain on this level if progress is to be made. There must be
a second negation, a negation of negation, which negates this
dividedness. This second negation (see Phen. section 30/PhAn.
p. 26) is the reversal of opposition which posits the reuniting
of Spirit to itself.
In contrast, [speculative] philosophy considers not unessential
determinations, but determination insofar as it is essential;
its element and content is not the abstract or the non-actual,
but the actual, that which posits itself and is living in
itself, existence in its own Concept. It is the process which
begets and passes through its own moments, and this entire
movement constitutes the positive[in it] and its truth.5
The recurrence of the word "actual" alerts us'to the primacy of
actuality and balance in his dialectic. The desire for unity and
completeness (good Platonic goals) characterizes Hegel's speculative
dialectic.
1. The ambiguity of aufheben. It may be said that the
entire Hegelian system is based on a delightful ambiguity in
the verb aufheben. Hegel himself describes the double entendrd' of
this word (usually translated "to sublate") in an excursus in
the Science of Logic:
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''To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the
one hand, it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it
also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to
preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something
is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which
is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus
what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only
lost its immediacy but is not on that account annhilated.
Thus, the first negation is suppressed in the positing of the
second negation, but not done away with. The first negation is
actually made part of the second negation. This is often expressed
in the literature as the "sublation" of the first negation and
its "supererogation" into the second negation.
2. The Concept. The German word behind the words Notion and
Concept (Begriff) is a rich one which is not easily captured in
translation. Much as Geist entails both an objective comprehensiveness and a subjective apprehension, so also Begriff has both
sides in its purview. Some philosophers (mostly British) militantly advocate the translation "Notion," arguing that this
carries the implication of nous (intuition) which is an important
part of this term. These are usually the same ones who call
for the "Mind" translation of Geist.

The advocates of NOtion

justly claim that this mental emphasis is important, but as with
Geist, the other side is more helpful in their rendition.
The word "notion" is far too light in its connotations to
properly denote such a pregnant term as Begtiff, and there is
also an etymological aspect to the problem. The verb greifen
means to grasp or clutch, and this is the root meaning of Begriff,
"that which is grasped"(by the mind). This parallels the Latin
conceptus, "captured together with." It is doubtful whether
anyone save a die-hard philologist actively associates every use
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of Notion with nous and Concept with conceptus.

When these arg-

uments are all weighed, it seems that Concept best expresses the
meaning of Begriff.
See the "Roundtable" article by Kainz in O'Malley, Legacy.
It is not an easy matter to properly understand the relation
of the Concept to the Hegelian system in general, but it is
absolutely essential that the reader understand this point. This
is th+erve center of 'his system. We will discuss the following
three aspects of the Concept: the meaning of Concept, synonymns
for the Concept, and teleology in the Concept.
a. The meaning of Concept. The principal significance
of the Concept is the balanced underlying unity which it denotes
of existing things.
Thus the dialectical movement of substance through causality
and reciprocity is the immediate genesis of the concept,
the exposition of the process of its becoming. But the
significance of its becoming, as of every becoming, is that
it is the reflection of the transient into its ground and
that the at first apparent other into which the former has
passed constitutes its truth. Accordingly the Concept is
the truth of substance; and since substance has necessity
for its specific mode of relationship, freedom reveals itself
as the truth of necessity and as the mode of relationship .
proper to the Concept. 7

The Concept is the essence of all existing things. He claims that
there is, underlying all things, a common bond of unity which
flows through reality,and this unity is the Concept.
It is only fair to point out, however, that there are, in
addition to the Concept, many "concepts." As the Concept is the
essence of all reality, taken as a whole, the lesser concepts are
in turn the essences of aspects of reality. Thus there is a
concept of law, a concept of mathematics, a concept of zoology,
etc. All the (lesser)concepts are then interrelated in that they
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are all aspects of the Concept. All concepts, in as much as they
are still of particular parts of reality, are only partial and are
therefore "false." The true existence of each concept lies only
in its relation to the whole of reality, which is complete only
in the Concept.
b. Synonymns for the Concept. We can gain numerous
insights into the nature of the Concept by studying expressions
which contain correlative ideas. We will examine these three:
"the truth ()Maas Wahrheit der], "essence"(weseml, and "actuality"
(Wirklichkeitj.

The expression "the truth of" has already occurred in
several quotations given above in this study. The expression has
two emphases which are worth our attention, one conceptual and
one methodological.
Conceptually, the notion of "truth" has reference to finding
the underlying essence of reality (much as Aristotle's nous
discovering essences). In the Science of Logic

is

he states:

The demons rated absoluteness of the Concept relatively to
the materia f experience and, more exactly, to the categories
and concepts of reflection, consists in this, that this
material as it appears apart from and prior to the Concept
had no truth; this it has §olely in its ideality or its
identity with the Concept.°
The true is only in the Concept, which is the underlying basis
of all that exists.
From the standpoint of method, we are solemnly warned that
we must think the whole as found in the Concept. Since the true
is the whole, and the false is the partial, it follows that
whenever we are operating on a partial or one-sided level we
have not yet found the true.
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"the truth of" in his dialectical motion to express the overcoming
of one-sided incompleteness. The expression "the truth of" serves
to alert u to the fact that we have discovered the universal
element which relates it to the whole. We frequently find that
Hegel concludes sections of the Phenomenology

with this expression,

signalling that we are now ready to proceed to the next stage.
The best way to appreciate this is to simply pick up.a
copy of the Phenomenology and look at the last-paragraph
of each of the earlier sections. An excellent discussion
-ofEthis is in Phen.- pp. 66-47/Phtln. 70-71. See also Science
of Dogic pp. 588, 577-578/Wissenschaft der Logik II,
226, 214.
The word "essence" is richly suggestive in this connection,
for it brings to mind the numerous parallels which were probably
also in Hegel's mind. We will mention only the most obvious
one here, the connection with Aristotle's notion of essence.
One of Aristotle's most frequent ways of referring to the
essence of something is with the expression T6 're Av ervaL ("the
something it was and continues to be" I. The fjv, being the
imperfect tense of "to be," expresses the underlying unity and
continuity of the thing being investigated. Aristotle's theory
of knowledge hinges on the underlying continuity of the.subject
[6nometuevov], since the thing remains itself despite accidental
(superficial) changes. Hegel says the same thing:
This knowledge [absolute scientific knowing] is a mediated
knowing for it is not found immediately with and in essence,
but starts from an other, from being, and has a preliminary
path to tread, that of going beyond being, or. rather, of
penetrating into it. Not until knowing inwardizes, recollects
[erinnert] itself out of immediate [merely subjective[being,
xltoes it through this mediation find essence. The German
language has preserved essence in the past participle
(gatietenj of the verb to bc; for essence is past--but
timelessly past--being.9
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From what has been discussed in the pages above, it should be
clear that the Concept is the "essence" of reality, the one
underlying truth which is , unchanging amidst all change.
Actuality is closely tied to truth, for Hegel, for actuality
clearly involves balance and wholeness. The German word which
in Hegel means "actuality" Wirklichkeitj is ordinarily translated
"reality"in other contexts, but not in Hegel. For Hegel, what is
real [reels] is merely what exists, and is always particularized
and one-sided. Actuality, on the otherhand, is a term which
expresses what is ideal [ideel]. Actuality is the balanced and
completed version of what here exists as partial; the actuality
of something must be discovered by searching for the other side
of its existing one-sidedness.
All existing reality is determinate. Thus, the task of
philosophy is t*ind the universal which complements this particularity. This aim was expressed in a quotation cited earlier in
this chapter:
In contrast, [speculative] philosophy considers not unessential
determination, but determination insofar as it is essential;
its element and content is not the abstract or the non-actual,
but the actual; that which posits itself and is living in
itself, existence in its own Concept. It is the process which
begets and passes through its Own movements, and this entire
movement constitutes the positive [in it] and its truth.10
c. Teleology in the Concept. As noted above in this paper,
one of the key principles in the Hegelian system is that of an
immanent teleology. Teleology is vital to the system, for without
it there would not be an orderly system but something more like
the blind, aimless, and malevolent "Will" of 6chopenhauer.
There must be rationally intelligible purpose in Hegel's universe,
and this is furnished by the very character of the system itself.
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the same truth, Hegel maintains that the very structure of the
universe is logical and rational.
What has been said can also be expressed by saying that
Reason is purposive activity [zweckmassige Thun]. The
exaltation of a supposed Nature over a misconceived thinking,
and especially the rejection of external teleology, has brought
the form of purpose in general into discredit. Still, in the
sense in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive
activity, purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the
unmoved which is also self-moving, and as such is Subject.11
3. The Conceptual dialectic of moments. The customary way
of characterizing Hegel's dialectic is with the expression "thesisantithesis-synthesis," but this is, in fact, a poor caricature of
his dialectic. A far more accurate (though less catchy) expression
is "Conceptual dialectic of moments." There are three aspects of
this expression which need our attention: moments (Nomente],
mediation (vermittlung]/reconciliation (VersOhnungl, and the
"cumulative effort."
a. Hegel refers to "moments" as synonymous with "stages."
A moment is a step in the progress of Spirit towards the goal of
complete knowledge. As such, each moment is a necessary part
of the whole motion but is °true" only as it is considered as
part of the whole dialectic. Each moment is caught up [autlgehoben]
in the cumulative sweep of the Spirit's education.
There is a point of comparison with Aristotle's theory of
time which may be interesting to note. Aristotle considered
moments to be potential points in the continuum of time. For
Aristotle, a "moment" is an "unreal" part of time, for true time
is not composed of moments. Rather, time is potentially divisible
into moments. While Hegel considers his "moments" to be real
components of history, both Aristotle and Hegel agree that moments
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considered apart from the flow of time are "unreal" or "untrue."
For both, the truth of time lies in its actualized motion, not
in the potential points along the way.
b. The notion of mediation is central to Hegel's
philosophy. So far as I can determine, his two usual words for
mediation

[Vermittlung]

and reconciliation

[Versiihnung)

are

essentially synonymous but perhaps express different emphases.
The different emphases are revealed in the etymological roots.
Nitte is the word for a logical middle term, and thus vermitt/ung
has logical overtones which remind us of the logical/rational
nature of mediation in his system.

Der Sohn

is the appellation

for Christ in the German language, and his use of

Versiihnung

ought to call to mind the reconciliatory/redemptory work of
Christ. On linguistic grounds we may say that VermittlunglOmphasizOS
the logical necessity of mediation, while

Versahnung

emphasizes

the resulting unity of opposites,but in point of fact these lexical distinctions may be finer than he intends. At any rate,
the two are virtually synonymous.
Hegel's unique concept of mediation/reconciliation centers
in the notion of a "higher unity." The notion of "higher unity"
is based on the notion of higher truth, which simply refers to
"the truth of" a particular opposition. The higher truth of
opposites lies in their being manifestations of the Concept, in
which all opposites find their complement. Given the higher
truth of two seemingly irreconcilible opposites, we can discover
a unity which is "higher" than the opposites and unites them,
What energizes this mediation is not a "third," but the very
Concept which is the essence of the two opposites. Thus, mediation
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is the self-movement of opposites to unity, or self-refleCtion.
For mediation is nothing beyond self-moving selfi-sameness,
or is reflection into self, the moment of the'I' which is for
itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction,
simple becoming. The 'I', or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just immediacy
in the processnof becoming, and is the immediate self.
Reason is, therefore, misunderstood when reflection is
excluded from the True, and is not grasped as a positive
moment of the Absolute. It is reflection that makes the True
a result, but it is equally reflection that overcomes the
antithesis between the process of its becomigg and the
result...12
.c. The cumulative effort. As discussed in Chapter three,
the education of Spirit is cumulative. The goal of Spirit in
the world.(as the Concept) is to probe all reality by discovering
itself as the essence of all that exists. Thus Spirit is accumulating full and perfect knowledge of itself. This is the telos
of the. Hegelian philosophy.

Excursus: The Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Myth
In the interest of clarifying Hegel's dialectic, it is
worth a few words to discuss the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis
myth (we will refer to it as TAS). Since Hegel is one of those
philosophers who are frequently alluded to but seldom read carefully, it is not surprising that he is glibly characterized as
holding the TAS dialectic. This was actually foisted on Hegel
by his erstwhile follower Karl Marx, based on the fact that Hegel
borrowed aspects of his method from Fichte, who used this terminology and method explicitly.
The problem with the TAS scheme is that it misinterprets
Hegel's philosophy at its most crucial point. The unique feature
of Hegel's philosophy, what empowers it, is his claim that there
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is not immediately evident 'apt nonetheless functioning. The
Concept is what interconnects everything, and in the Concept
all opposition is reconciled to itself in its opposite.
The TAS scheme is the language of the Aristotelian syllogism,
which operates by fixed rules. These rules carefully delineate
the meaninglpf contradiction, identity, etc" and allow no exceptions.
Hegel minces no words in telling us that this ordinary logic is
stuck on the level of Understanding, and that this is insufficent
for understanding the unifying operation of the Concept. If we
persist is using the TAS language, we will consistently confuse
ourselVes about the main point of the Hegelian system, Most
descriptions of the Hegelian system do mention the proper role
of the Concept in overcoming opposition, but use of the language of propositional thinking hinders our proper understanding
of the conceptual dialectic of moments. Eric Weil has magnificently
summarized the problem:
a
At the risk of shocking those who hold tolztradition boo much
accredited, the Hegelian dialectic does net proceed by thesis,
antithesis, and synthsis; it derives nothing from the Fichtean
dialectic, to which it is violently opposed. It grasps the
particular concept, purely and in its purity, sees it pass
into its contrary, and testifies that this contrary is not
3.0, but is the contrary of the first, which is thus preserved
in it, mediated with itself.and,thus mediated, is itself
preserved in being elevated and liberated from its particular
finitude into a higher logico!ontological concept that is a
result and at the same time the point of departure and uncovery
of a new contradiction-harmony. The substance-accident pair
moves into that of cause and effect, which passes into the
category of interaction (wechselvirkung), a still-notestablished presence of the concept, the point of departure
of a new chapter of the Logic . No particular concept is
the concept; but the concept is only its own becoming within
the movementof the particular concepts throughout the
categories."
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Other discussions are in Glockner, pp. 135ff., Mueller,
p.4, Sarlemijn, p.122, and Kaufmann, pp. 167-69. Stace
understands the basics of the dialectic, but discusses it
in terms of propositions (TAS) instead of concepts; thus
he castigates Hegel on p. 97 for having failed to succeed
in carrying out his dialectic. Certainly Hegel did not
intend a dialectic such as Stace attributes to him.
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Notes to Chapter Four
1 Translation mine; Phenomenology p.25. Phanomenolog4.32:"IM
mathematischen Erkennen ist die Einsicht ein fOr die Sache Ausserliches Thun; es folgt daraus, dass die wahre Sache dadurch verAndert wird. Das Mittel, Construction und Beweis, enthAlt daher
wohi wahre SAtze; aber ebensosehr muss gesagt werddn, dass der
Inhalt falsch ist."
2Phenomenology p.29; Phanomenologielp.36:"DieSer Formalismus...
meynt die Natur und das Leben einer Gestalt begriffen und ausgesprochen zu haben, wenn er von ihr eine Bestimmung des Schema's
als PrAdicat ausgesagt,--es sey die SubjectivitAt, oder auch der
Magnetismus, die ElectricitAt,und so fort, die Contraction, oder
Expansion, der Osten oder Westen und dergliechen, was sich ins
unendliche vervielfAltigen lAsst, weil nach dieser Weise jede
Bestimmung oder Gestalt bey der andern wieder als Form oder
Moment des Schema's gebraucht werden, und jede dankbar der andern
denselben Kienst leisten kann;--ein Cirkel von Gegenseitigkeit,
wodurch man nicht erflhrt, was die Sache selbst, weder was die
dine noch die andre ist."
3An excellent discussion of this topic was penned by Hegel in
his Introduction to the Science of Logic, "General Notion of Logic"
(Wissenschaft der Logik I, "Allgemeiner Begriff der Logik").
4 My translation; Phenomenology pp.32-33. Phanomenolog116.39:"Aber
in die Materie versenkt und in deren Bewegung fortgehe d, kommt
es in sich selbst zurdck, abeilicht eher als darin dass die
Erfdllung oder der Inhalt sich in sich zurticknimmt, zur Bestimmtheit
vereinfacht, sich selbst zu Einer Seite eines Daseyns berabsetzt,
und in seine hftere Wahrheit dbergeht. Dadurch emergirt das
einfache sich dbersehende Ganze selbst aus dem Reichthume, worin
seine Reflexion verloren schein."
5My translation; Phenomenology p.27. Phanomenologie p. 34:"Die
Philosophie dagegen betrachtet nicht unwesentliche Bestimmung,
sondern sie in sofern sie wesentliche ist; nicht das Abstrakte oder
Unwirkliche ist ihr Element und Inhalt, sondern das Wirkliche,
sich selbst setzende und in sich lebende, das Daseyn in seinem
Begriffe. Es ist der Process, der sich seine Momente erzeugt
und druchlAufft, und diese ganze Bewegung macht das Positive
und seine Wahrheit aus."
6Science of Logic, p.107; Wissenschaft der Logik I, p.94: "Aufheban
hat in der Sprache den gedoppelten Sinn, dass es so viel als
aufbewahren erhalten bedeutet und zugleich so viel als aufh8ren
lassen, ein Ende machen. Das Aufbewahrenselbst schliesst schon
das Negative in sich, dass etwas seiner Unmittelbarkeit und
damit einem den ausserlichen Einwirkungen offnen Dasein entnommen
sird, un es zu erhalten.--So ist das Aufgehobene ein zugleich Aufbewahrtes, das nur seine Unmittelbarkeit verloren hat, aber darum
nicht vernichtet ist."
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Chapter Four notes, continued
7Science of Logic, pp. 577-8 (translation modified); Wissenschaft
der Logik, II, p.214: "Did dialektische Bewegung der Substanz
durch die KausalitAt und Wechselwirkung hindurch ist daher die
unmittelbare Genesis des Begriffes, durch welche sein Werden
dargesteilt wird. Aber sein Werden hat, wie das Werden dberall,
die Bedeutung, dass es die Reflexion des Uebergehenden in seinen
Grund ist, und dass das zunAchst anscheinend Andere, in welches
das erstere dbergegangen, dessen Wahrheit ausmacht. So ist der
Begriff die Wahrheit der Substanz, und indem die bestimmte
VerhAltnissweise der Substanz die Notwendigkeit ist, zeigt sich
die Freiheit als die Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit und als die
Verhilltnissweise des Begriffs."

8Science of Logic, p. 591 (translation modified); Wissenschaft
der Logik II, p. 230: "Darin besteht die gegen und an dem
empirischen Stoff und genauer an seinen Kategorien und ..Reflexionsbestimmungen erwiesene Absolutheit des Begriffes, dass derselbe
nicht, wie er ausser und vor dem Begriffe erscheint, Wahrheit
habe, sondern allein in seiner IdealitAt oder IdentitAt mit
dem Begriffe."
9Science of Logic, p.389; Wissenschaft der Logik II, p.3:"Diese
Erkenntnis ist ein vermitteltes Wissen,denn sie Befindet sich
nicht unmittelbar beim und im Wesen, sondern beginnt von einem
Andern, dem Sein, und hat einen voklAufigen Weg,den Weg des
Hinausgenens fiber das Sein oder vielmehr des Hineingehens in
dasselbe zu machen. Erst indem das Wissen Bich aus dem unmittelbaren Sein erinnert , durch diese Vermittlung findet Bich
es .deis Wesen.-Die Sprache hat im Zeitwort sein das Wesen in
der vergangenen Zeit, "gewesen", behalten; denn das Wesen ist
das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Sein."
10My translation; for the German text from PhEnomenologie
see note 5 above.

page 34

11My translation; Phenomenology, p.12. PhMnomenologie, p.20:"Das
Gesagte kann auch so ausged .dkt werden, dass die Vernunft das
ist. Die Erhebung der vermeinten Natur
fiber das miskannte Denken, und zunAchst die Verbannung der
Aussern ZwekcmAssigkeit hat die Form des Zwecks dberhaupt in
Misskredit gebraucht. Allein, wie auch Aristotles die Natur
als das zweckmAssigi Thun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmittelbare, das Ruhende, welches selbst bewegend, oder Subject
ist."
zweckmfissige Thun
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Chapter Four notes, continued
12 Phenomenology, pp. 11-12; Phanomenologie, pp. 19-20:" Denn die
Vermittlung ist nichts anders als die sich bewegende Sichselbstgleichheit, oder sie die Reflexion in sich selbst, das Moment
des fersichseyenden Ich, oder das Werden Oberhaupt, dieses
Vermitteln ist um seiner Einfachheit willen eben die werdende
Unmittelbarkeit und das Unmittelbare selbst..--Es ist daher ein
Verkennen der Vernunft, wenn die Reflexion aus dem Wahren
ausgeschlossen und nicht als positives Moment des Absoluten
erfasst wird. Sie ist es, die das Wahre zum Resultate macht,
aber diesen Gegensatz gegen sein Werden ebenso aufhebt
000 "

13In 04 Malley, Legacy, p. 56.
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Chapter Five: Hegel's Philosophy of Religion

It is said by some thatHegel's philosophy is thoroughly
secularized (because God is finitized) and it is - said by others
that Hegel's philosophy is supremely religious (because the goal
of his philosophy is to reach divinity). Though both interpretations
have considerable validity, neither is sufficently accurate to
command our assent without further clarification.
The curious fact facing the interpreter of Hegel's philosophy of religion is that he not only brings his •:own preconc.ved
notions about religion and philosophy to the task, but that his
very attitude already. is shaped by Hegel. The ideological
backgtound of some interpreters (e.g. Marxists) has already
inclined them to hold an atheistic reading of Hegel, the broadminded theistic views of others has inclined them such that they
find themselves attracted to the view that Hegel's philosophy is
the epitome of Christian expression, and the traditional convictions of others has already led them to perhaps accept the
theistic reading of Hegel but completely reject the possibility
of incotpqrating his philosophy of religion into their own.
Among the secularists we note the names of Marx and Feuerbach
(who denied that:Hegel4 s claims are legitimate because they
consider his claim to be literally that man "becomes God"),and also
the more contemporary secularists Kaufmann, KoAve, and Findlay,
who consider Hegel's discussion of "religious consciousness" to
be a merely metaphorical reference to a completely secular
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enrichment of the human consciousness. Among the supporters of
Hegel's "theistic" philsosphy we include the so-called Hegelian
Riight, and more recently, thelinterpretation of Iwan Iljin.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe some aspects of
Hegel's phirpophy of religion. The magnitude of this topic,
demonstrated by the vast literature, dictates that this chapter
and the one which follows it must be selective. This discussion
will :not pretend to be a full survey, as that can be found in
the better books. Similarly, we cannot indulge in a discussion
of later developments and interpretations of this philosophy.
What we will do here is outline the progress of his thought to
the mature position, and then show how certain 'biblical themes
are given a speculative interpretation in his system.
In the Conclusion we will complete our survey of his system
by shifting perspectives, from the standpoint of religion to
the standpoint of philosophy. There

will see how religion

fits into the entire scheme of speculative philosophy. In these
chapters we will not give so much attention as before to the
"literature reports"

in past chapters, as the literature is

vast and could not be effectively summarized in a few sentences.
Rather, we will concentrate on introducing some key topics and
allow the reader to use the books indicated in the Appendix
devoted to an introductory bibliography to get started.
A. Hegel encounters religion
There is a wide variation of opinion regarding the value of
Hegel's early manuscripts in establishing his philosophical
doctrines. Some scholars view these notebooks as the musing
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enthusiastic,claiming that these are among his best works
and that all his later doctrines can be found lying dormant in these
essays. The truth lies somewhere between these extreme opinions.
We will discuss his early essays because they give us an understanding of the development of his later position, but it is
essentially true that they are not vital to, our understanding of
his mature position,'
1.

Volksreligion

and

Volksgeist.

In a series of fragments

dating from about 1792 (age 22), entitled by Nohl (pp.1-:72)
Volksreligion

und

Christentum,

Hegel discusses the relation of
and the religion of a

the "spirit" of a people

[Volksgeist]

people

Hegel claims thalthe spirit and the

(Volksreligion].

religion of a people go together, as the "spirit" is really the
special product of the time and circumstances, while religion
is both a shaper and the shaped as it interacts with the thought
of the people. He extolls the Greeks for having a religion which
achieved a good balance between the subjective will of the individual and the objective will of the state. His prosaic account
is interesting, but too early and fragmentary to be of great
importance. 2
2.

.

Das Leben Jesu.

Hegel's "Life of Jesus" was written in

1795. This is a.confusing work, not only because it is difficult
to interpret but also because the interpretations are difficult.
Some consider it to be nearly meaningless (Knox refused to
include it,. with the material mentioned immediately above, because
"they have not seemed worth translation"), while others attach
greater importance to it. This "life of Jesus" is not an ordinary

-68chronicle of the life of Christ, for it pays little attention to
the historical events in his life (it stpps at the cross) and
devotes most of its space to the preaching of Jesus. The words
of Jegus are those of a Kantian moral preacher. It seems that this
was important in Hegel's development, for there are themes which
are not part of the Kantian philsophical enterprise (e.g., "harmony").
Hegel realized that the Kantian morality is not an adequate:basis
for a religion, for there is a division between the will of the
individual and the categorical (rigid universal) imperative which
governs the acts of the individuil which (as noted in Chapter One)
Kant's moral philosophy simply does not adequately unite.
3. `Die Positivitat der christlichen Religion. With .the
unsatisfactory outcome of the "Life of Jesus" Hegel proceeded
to construct a better synthesis of the aims of Kant and the
Greeks in "The Positivity of the Christian Religion" (1795-6).
He unites the Kantian and Gmedk philosophies, and compares this
to the Christian religion. He decided that the Christian religion
is woefully lacking because he believed that Christianity tends
to institutionalize and petrify the "spirit" instead of allowing
it to develop. Because Christianity is concerned with historicity
and dogma, it is unable to freely develop with a culture and thus
is inadequate as a "people's religion.
In this text he sounds a complaint which is evident in all
his later writings. The theme of "positivity' is important in
Hegel's philosophy of religion. The main reason why Christianity
failed was that it is too positivistic. (Positivism refers to
limitation of inquiry to facts "posited" or given in any particular case.) By discussing his thoughts so frankly in this essay
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religion. The reader will be rewarded generously if he carefully
remembers to use this complaint against positivity as a basis
for interpreting the Hegelian reinterpretation of Christianity,
ancialso in reading the history of theology in subsequent decades.3
4. Der Geist Christentum and sein Schicksal. Upon further
writing and thinking, Hegel concluded that his analysis of
Christianity did not properly comprehend its full potential.
After the composition of the "Positivity" essay, he had a sort
of religious experience which &ed him to appreciate the place of
"love" in life. He still accepted the Kantian notion of duty and
the Greek religious ideal of beauty, but in his 1798-99 essay
"The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" he expressed the opinion
that the Christian ideal of love is the :proper combination of
Kantian morality (a kind of love, he thought) and Greek beauty.
Thus, for Hegel in this essay Christian "love" is moral beauty.
Now he places the onus on Judaism for not having an open religion
of love, since it killed Jesus.
5.Phenomenology and religion. The publication of his Phenomenology of Spirit

in 1807 ended the early gropings for a clear

understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology.
In this work he sets out an agenda which "puts religion in its
place" in the strongest sense of the expression. As we will see,
his very programme sets the result clearly in sight long before
we come to the conclusion of the book. Before discusting the
relation of religion to phenomenology, it may be helpful to expand
on his definition of "phenomenology." For Hegel, phenomenology
is simply the study (logos) of what appears in the world (phenomena).
S.
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It is the search for essences, the discovery of the Concept as
we described it in the last chapter.
Hegel's agenda in the Phenomenology determines the final
position of religion in his system; as Dr. Collins puts it aptly,
phenomenology tames religion. Our discussion of the problem of
a beginning in Chapter Three revealed that for Hegel the progress
fo the individual to Science begins wherever he may so desire.
What matters is that this is the journey of Spirit (in the human
spirit)back to itself as Absolute Spirit. It is, as we discussed
above, Spirit observing itself in Nature and thereby explicating
its own content. The religious experience is part of the selfeducation of Spirit, and as such is part of the phenomenological
path which Spirit must traverse.
Hegel indicates frequently that the phenomenological path
is one of intense struggle, a "labor of the Concept." As such,
the experience of religion is part of the struggle of the human
consciousness to reach absolutely complete knowledge. As we will
see in more detail in the next chapter, religion is the stage
penultimate to ultimate philosophical knowledge. This. unquestionably subordinates religion to philosophy, since religion is
only a moment on the way to the standpodnt of Science.
Hegel indicates to us that the
system
is an introduction to his entireA
Phenomenology).

Phenomenology of Spirit

(see the subtitle of the

This is certainly so, and we can draw the

obvious inference that this phenomenological approach to religion
remains a part of his mature system throughout his career.
Nonetheless, an examination of Chapters Seven and Eight in the
Phenomenology reveals that his treatment of religion is less
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subtle here than in later works. The Phenomenology of Spirit
is the introduction to his mature philosophy of religion, but
that philosophy of religion is much clerer in the Encyclopedia
and the later collected lecture series.
B. Themes
The following themes are important in Bagel's philosophy
simply because the recur quite often,and usually with some major
philosophical import. It will be obvious from the start that
he has no intention-,of-'explainine these conventional doctrines
in any traditional way. From his criticism of positivity in
Christianity and from his view of theology as servant to philosophy,
it should be apparent that .he is reinterpreting these traditional
doctrines so as to make them pedagogical tools for the furtherance
of philosophical understanding. We ihould be fair and tote that
he believed that these are more than literary parallels; he
considered himself a pious Lutheran Christian and believed sincerely
that these traditional doctrines are genuinely fulfilled in his
philosophical system.
1. Trinity Hegel believed that the notion of the Trinity is
a good tool for explaining thl4ctivity of Spirit. He viewed
the traditional view of the Trinitarian procession as parallel
to his Universal-Particular-Individual explanation of cosmic
history. He divided the history of the world into three ages,
as we have already seen: the age of contentless unity (the Father)
the age of estrangement, in which the Universal becomes Particulars
(age of the Son), and the reconciliation of Universal and Particular
in the (balanced) individual, or the presence of the Spirit in
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the community of believers.
In addition to numerous discussions of a Trinitarian nature
in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Encyclopedia
sections 566571 and Phenomenology section 77-0/ Philnomenologie
pp. 410-411 are very explicit discussions.
2. Death of God. As the Trinity is a general representation of
the principle that all things must pass into their opposites to
find a higher unity, the death of God is a general pict‘ire which
illustrates numerous aspects of philosophical truth. As Collins
points out (Emergence, 262ff.), there are three basic ways in which
Hegel wants to discuss the death of God. First, he can report
(as Nietzsche did later in the same century) that God is dead in
the sense that belief and piety have declined disastrously.
God is also "dead' in a second sense, that Christian religion
can well be understood as a symbol of the hindrance which institutionalization and dogma places on the progress of Spirit
(again, the "positivity" critique). Third, and most important,
is the speculative death of God. By this he .means the truth that
all things must 'perish" before they can live.
In this speculative mode of discussion, Hegel i referring
to the death and resurrection of God as symbolic of the negativity
and double negativity which is the heartbeat of speculative metaphysics. Further, Hegel wants us to understand that in.order to
fit under the scheme of absolute philosophy the notion of a transcendant God must also perish. It ought to be clear by now that
if the Absolute is what he calls God, and the Absolute becomes
finite matter and mind in the world, th n God is finite and humans
are becoming gods. There is a question whether it is more correct
to speak of Hegel "secuiiarizing religion" or "sacralizing history,"
but the result is essentially the same. Human history is God's
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history, and the human spirit (taken collectively) is becoming
divine.
There are numerous applications .of the "death of God" theme
to philosophy. We will see that several of the upcoming themes
are under the rubric of God's death.
Collin's discussion in God; in Modern Philosophy (pp.202ff.)
is also helpful. The 'historical report" aspect of the death
of God can be found, for example, in the first lecture of the
Vorlesungen Ober die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes. The second
kind of 'death' is evident in the "Positivity" essay and runs
through several works. On the speculative "death" see Phen.pp.
454-5,470-71/ Phan. pp. 410, 414-5, and 418; in the
Encyclopedia see sections 251 and 568ff; in FAith and Knowledge
see p. 190 (Gesammelte Werke vol.4, 413-14). On the finitude
of God, note the final words of the Phenomenology which
include a quotation from Schiller which Hegel greatly altered
by simply adding the word slur (only). The impact of this
is to assert that God is limited to this world. The notion
of a transcendent God is killed conclusively in his reworking
of the proofs of God's existence.
3. Incarnation. In keeping with his distrust of "positive"

religion, Hegel is unwilling to speak very clearly regarding the
historical life of Jesus Christ. He is more interested in discussing the philosophical significance of saying that there was a
being who was both true God and true man.
There are three main points of significance for Hegel. First,
the mention of xeveSaLc in Philippians chapter two is aptly
symbolic of the creation of ther.world (for kenosis language see
Phen. p.457 and 465/Phan.p.403 and410). The absolute, in creating
the Son/world has emptied itself by alienating itself in particularized negativity. Hegel is fond of the terms Entfremdung (estrangement) and Rntgasserung (externalization). Christ is also to be
considered the reconciliation [VersOhnung] and mediation(vermittiang]
between God and man, precisely because as divine he is most fully
human. Third, Christ is an important symbol because he reminds
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us that death is a prerequisite to new life. The death of Christ
was necessary, because he was fully divine in a certain sense
but not in the fullest sense. The full divinity (presence of
the Spirit) did not come about until after his death, at which
time the (Holy)Spirit came to live in the more perfect immaterial
form of Spirit in the life of the religious community. This is ,
symbolic of the relation of religion to philosophy, that religion
is a physical-symbolic (and therefore incomplete) version. of
philosophical truth, which is not withoul6symbolism but includes
a higher level of representational thinking.
4.Creation. It is not a simple matter to discuss the Trinity,
death of God, incarnation, creation, and the related biblical
topics in a series of discrete parts, for each of these is
inseparably bonded to the others. All these themes are interconnected by the theme of negativity, and express aspects of this
basic part of his system.
According to the biblical record, the world was created
ex nihilo

by God. Since the Hegelian Trinity works out its

progress in an act of self-alienation, Hegel's version of the
creation account does not involve ex nihilo creation. Rather,
instead of the Father creating the world and remaining transcendent
above it (as the biblical record indicates), according to Hegel
the Father is now alienated against himself in

ole

world. The

world is two-faced: the Father (as logical Idea or Concept)
and i

"other" (dead particularized matter) taken together are

the new—born world. Thus,creation by Hegel's account is simply
the coming of age of the Son, or the stage in the Father's quest
for self-knowledge which is self-alienation. Though ostensibly
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a destructive stage, the seeds of reconciliation are built into
the world (in the presence of the Father as Concept). Since
the Father is also the logical Concept which is the essence of
the world, redemption consists in finding the God/essence= which
is in the world and becoming one with it.
5. The Fall. If Hegel sees the purpose of human nature as that
of partecipating in and becoming one with the divine element in
the world, we would expect his account of the Fall into sin as
failure to meet that ideal. But his point is more profound.
Hegel understands the creation of Man to be simply the
existence of man in the world, with no responsibility for the
world. This amoral condition of innocence[schuidiosigkeitl
is proper to a state of nature, not of spirit, because if
Spirit is to be reunited to itself in the human consciousness
there must be concern for nature. Thus it is necessary to "fall"
from the state of innocence to a condition where the need for
oftheheed

reconciliation is recognized. From the awarenessA for reconciliation
begins the long process of return to Absolute Spirit.
6.Redemption. Contrary to the traditional understanding of the
doctrines of creation, incarnation, and redemption, Hfgel is
not particularly interested in the historical events with which
these are traditionally associated. All three are understood to
be processes whibh take place simultaneously on several levels
of interaction. Creation is a negativity by which God Is continually dividing itself into the matter and form of the world,
incarnation is the process whereby rational Spirit observing
itself in nature leads itself to divinization, and redemption is
a religious term for the philosophical process of reuniting
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The terms 'redemption° and *mediation' both refer to the
reconciling process, which .has been discussed at length above
in various parts of this ppper.

Notes to Chapter Five

1Kroner has a good introduction to his early writings in the
front of the translation by Knox.
2Crites treats this well on pages 35-40.
3Co11ins covers this thoroughly in Emergence, pp. 223-240.
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Conclusion: Religion in the Speculative Philosophy

In the previous chapter we got a good picture of how Hegel
wants to understand the Christian religion. Again, the key
insight is his disdain for "positive' religion and his systematic
avoidance of it. His interpretation of the traditional doctrines
reflects this, and so does his placement of religion in the
speculative philosophy. He has made certain that religion is
adequately "tamed" so as to not usurp the place of philosophy.
In this chapter we conclude our outline of his philosophy
of religion by showing how he can now channel the content of
religion into his philosophy. Religion must be contained in
the scope oliolhilosophy; Absolute Science not including any
aspect of reality is nonsensical.
Surely the reader has wondered by now what has happened to
the non-Christian religions. The previous chapter was devoted
to the Christian religion, because Hegel regarded Christianity
as the epitome of religious thought. We cannot discuss his
argumentation, but he did believe that his Lutheran religion
is the highest stage of religious consciousness and most tompatable with the demands of philosophy. In his later years he
still spoke of "we Lutherans" and claimed that philosophy had
not weakened his faith but actually made it stronger.
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A. The identical content of religion and philosophy
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel claims that religion
and philosophy have an identical content (see Phen. p.485/PhAn.
p. 427); there is ansidentifty between the God of Christianity
(as he understands it) and the Absolute Concept/Idea. Hegel sees
the object of both religion and philosophy as the Absolute, and
the difference betweerthem lies in the way in which they come
to know it.
In his later works, Hegel explicates this difference clearly.
Since the third part of this chapter is devoted to this topic,
we will simply mention the main point here. Religion apprehends
the Absolute with -both representational thinking [Vorstellenden
Denken] and speculative reason, while' true philosophy

is

able to move past the need for pie'ture-thinking. Because
religious thought is not yet fully conceptual, it is imperfect
and is thus a stage on the way to philosophy. Still, the content
of aesthetic, religious, and philosophical thought is identical.
B. Proofs of God's Existende
Hegel's reconstruction of the traditional proofs of the
existence of God is extremely valuable in coming to grips with
how he systematically relocates religion inside philosophy. We
will cover his discussion under the following three headings:
Hegel's "God," Hegel's critique of Kant, and Hegel's ontologichl
proof.
1. Hegel's "God". As we noted previously, Hegel's version of
the Christian God is radically non-traditional. Hegel's God
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human consciousness), nor is it transcendent. The traditional
concept of God is useful to Hegel in formulating his philosophy,
but finally it must be recognized that this is nnly a reglesentational way of expressing philosophical truth.
We may isolate three particular features of HegeL's God.
First, God is not the God of theism (i.e., neither personal
nor transcendent). Second, neither the form nor the content
.

of God is demonstrable by ordinary rational argument (i.e. the
activity of mere Understanding). Third, God must:be dialectically
subordinated to the Absolute. That is, it must be understood that
the notion of God is an inferior way of referring to the Absolute,
and that speculative philosophy is the highest mode of knowing
the Absolute. From this description of God, we see how Hegel can
now fit a "proof" for the existence 6f God into his philosophy.
2. Hegel's Critique of Kant. In Chapter One we examined Kant's
treatment of the proofs of God's existence. There it became clear
that for Kant all proofs boil down to the ontological proof. Kant
criticized the ontological proof for assuming that we can easily
pass. from conceptual existence to real existence. The problem,
he asserted, is that we are never able to leap from analysis of
observable existing things to claims about non-observable things,
for the limit of certain knowledge is reached when we attempt to
discuss what is not observable. Discussion of God, the World, and
the Soul is not possible on the level of scientific certainty.
Hegel's attack on Kant centers on the notion of finitude.
Kant has located the figilure of these proofs in the gulf between
the (observable) finite and the (unobservable) infinite, while
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Hegel is not satisfied with this divorce. In keeping with his
dialectic, Hegel asserts that the finite is merely the phenomenon
which covers the infinite essence of all really existing things.
In the Hegelian system, it is axiomatic that individual things
exist only because there is an underlying infinite essence, which
is the Absolute.
3. Hegel's ontological proof. Hegel distinguishes between the
descriptive and the demonstrative functions of the three arguments.
All three of the so-called proofs describe how we are led by
observation of nature to affirm the existence of "God," but only
the ontological proof is demonstrative. The two proofs Which
are merely descriptive (the cosmological and the teleological)
lead us to affirm the existence of the infinite, because the
finite is only partially existing. It is more usual to dlaim
that God must exist because only the infinite could be the completion
of finite beings, but Hegel prefers to argue from the fact of partial
existence (as he puts it, "nonbeing") to show that something must
fully possess being.
All three proofs reduce to the ontological, Hegel claims,
because each contains in it an inner dialectic, and this dialectic
leads to the ontological proof. Both the cosmological and the
teleological proofs show that the existence of many partially
existing beings is explained by the existence of the Absolute.
This sounds pretty ordinary in the history of philosophy, except
th at his definition of God puts this in an entirely new light.
If God is immanent in nature and is only a moment in our philosophical cognition, then Hegel has not proved the existence of
what is usually called God, but rather the existence of the absolute
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essence in nature. What Hegel has done in his usual ingenious
way is to use a conventional apparatus of thought and appropriate
it for his own use in the System. Hegel has proved the existence
of the essence of the world, and he has no qualms about calling
this "God" the Absolute Idea or Absolute Spirit.
C. Art, Religion, Philosophy
Ih this section we are not so interested in each of the
three areas of thought individually as in the relation which they
have to each other in the Hegelian system. Thus, we will briefly
survey the sweep of motion from the stage or moment of art to
that of religion, and to philosophy.
Art, religion, and philosophy are simply different ways of
getting at the same truth, according to Hegel. Their content is
identical, but their forms are different. The artist recognizes
the Absolute with the senses, whether in drawing, music, sculpting
or another medium. This is indeed the Absolute, but since the
form of Absolute Spirit is logical, such a non-logical approach
is not appropriate and adequate for fully knowing the Absolute.
Religion is in a better position for knowing the Absolute.
In religious thought there is both an element of "picture thinking"
and rational (conceptual) thinking. On the one hand, there is a
multitude of symbols which are operative in religion (the artistic
aspect), but on the other hand, there is also the formulation of
rational thought about God. This conceptualization is the "truth"
of Eat in - religion, and thus religion is a synthesis of art and
philosophy, but not fully either.
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Philosophy includes the element of religion, but now
thinks conceptually instead of pictorially. Since the progress
of Spirit is the same as world history, the Hegelian philosophical
understanding of the relation of religion and philosophy boils
down to this: the religious community is where philosophical
enterprise is functioning at its finest level. Rememering Hegel's
distaste for static, fact-oriented religion, we see that Hegel
envisions a harmonious community (viz., the state-church) wherein
philosophical thought takes place with the support of a version
of Christianity which is dynamically changing to match the developments of philosophy.
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GETTING STARTED IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION:
A BASIC ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Note: this list is restricted to English sources, beginning
with the most• general and basic,.and ending with the
more specialized)
Wiedmann, Franz. Hegel: An Illustrated Biography. Trans. by
J. Neugroschel. New York: Pegasus Books, 1968.
A straight-forward brief biography, reasonably objective
and quite accurate. The text can be rather dry, but the
plates are excellent (they are far better in the German
edition). A good chronology follows the text.
Collins, James. A History of Modern European Philosophy.
Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1954.
A solid introduction to Hegel (and others of interest in
the volume). Written from a rather traditional Roman
Catholic perspective, but this does not influence the
exposition. Highly lucid.
Copleston, Frederick, S.J. History of Philosophy. Vol. VII.
Paramus, NJ: Newman Press, 1963.
An acceptable exposition in one of the stap1e histories.
Though not exceptional, Fr. Copleston does cover the material
in a brief and helpful fashion.
Stace, W.T. The Philosophy of Hegel. New York: Dover Publications,
1955 reprint of 1924 ed.
A standard exposition, showing undue attention to the Logic
and insufficent attention to the Phenomenology. It doesa,
instigate and perpetuate some myths and inaccuracies, but
generally helpful if not relied upon too heavily.
Gray, J. Glenn. Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. New York: Columbia
University Press (King's Crown division). 1941.
Covering more area than the title indicates, Gray masterfully
ties numerous aspects of Begel's thought together. Highly
recommended.
Kaufmann, Walter. Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary.

Garden City, New York: Doublday & Co., 1965.
As with G.E. Mueller's introduction, the main value of this
book lies primarily in "debunking" Hegel, secondarily in
presenting literary parallels and translations of some early
manuscripts, and certainly NOT in "interpreting" or "commenting"
on Hegel. His debunking of myths about Hegel (e.g., that
he is the father of Naziism) is good, and the literary insights
are interesting, but the reader will be unwise to trust any
philosophical judgements on his word alone.

-84-

Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1975.
An excellent introduction on an intermediate level of difficulty. The opening chapter on the connections between
the intellectual currents which preceded Hegel is magnificent.
The remainder of the work requires some perseverence for the
beginning reader to master, but will repay study generously.
Findlay, John N. Hegel: A Re-Examination. Net, Yorks Oxford
University Press, 1976 (slight revision of 1958 edition).
A helpful discussion from an "Analytic" perspective. Its
brevity is good in reducing the volume of material a person
must read to get the "meat," but th re is sometimes a
tendency tc be rather cryptic. On the .hole, none of
Findlay's introductory discussions (including particularly
that in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in O'Connor,
Critical History
have been especially helpful to me in
putting Hegel's philosophy together.
Rosen, Stanley. G.W.F Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of
Wisdom. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974.
An upper-level introduction which is rather demanding to
use. The difficulty is not from opacity or imprecision,
however, but due to the vigorous and searching character
of his treatment. In my judgment, this is the best single
volume in English on Hegel. A gold-mine of insights.
Welch, Claude. Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century.
Volume I: 17991870. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
His discussion of Hegel's philosophy of religion is put in
a valuable historical context and summarized ably.
Crites, Stephen. In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs.
Kierkegaard on Faith and History. American Academy of
Religion Studies in Religion, No.
Chambersberg, Penn.?,
American Academy of Religion, 1972.
The discussion of Hegel is excellent, placing a helpful
emphasis on his early philosophy of religion
Collins, James. The Emergence of - Philosophy of Religion.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
This is the magisterial exposition of Hegel's philosophy
of religion in English. Though on a rather high plane
of discussion, it will be intelligible and profitable
to any reader.
Collins, James. God in Modern Philosophy.Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1959.
The section on Hegel's philosophy of God is excellent and
will richly repay study.
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Fabro, Cornelio. God in Exile: Modern Atheism. Trans. by Arthur
Gibson. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1968
Fabro°s basic th sis in this magisterial study is that after
Thomas Aquinas there is a marked decline in the quality of
philosophy, and after Descartes° turn to the subjective
the path to atheism is paved. Whether we want to buy his
analysis, this work is a treasure chest of information.
Yerkes, James. The Christology of Hegel. Missoula, Montana:
Scholars Press, 1978.
This dissertation is rather technical, but is a good study
of the topic. Recommended highly.
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PRIMARY SOURCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Sources most central to grasping Hegel's philosophy)
Samtliche Werke, JubilAumsausgabe in XX B&nden, Ed, Hermann

Glockner, Stuttgart: F. Frommann Verlag, 1927-30. Now the
basic "Complete" edition, but Felix Meiner Verlag has been
issuing text-critical editions of this edition on a volumeby-volume basis in their Philosophische Bibliothek.
Werke in zwanzig Wiz:den, Ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Michel,

Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969-75. Covers basically
the same material as above, but with slightly different
editing, set in Roman type, and bound inexpensively. A fine
study edition for personal use.
Gesammelte Werke (Neue kritische Ausgabe). Produced in cooperation

with several commissoLons, notably the Rheinisch-WestfAlischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften and particularly the HegelArchiv at Ruhr-UniversitAt, Bochum. Published by Felix Meiner
Verlag, Hamburg, 1968-. This is the edition which will
supercede all other texts, to be completed in about 20 years
and anticipated to reach 36 volumes.
These are the currently available volumes:
Band 4: Jenaer kritische Schriften, Hartmut Buchner
and Otto P8ggeler, 1968.
Band 6: Jenaer Systementwerfe I, Klaus Ddsing and
Heinz Kimmerle, 1975.
Band 7: Jenaer Systementwerfe II, Roif Horstmann
and Johann Heinrich Trede, 1971
Band 8: Jenaer Systementwerfe III, Rolf Horstmann
and Johann Heinrich Trede, 1976.
Band 9: Phanomenologie des Geistes, Wolfgang Bonsiepen
and Reinhard Heede, 1980.
Band 11: Wissenschaft der Logik, Die objektive Logik
(1812-13), Friedrich Hogemann and Walter
Jaeschke, 1978.
Wissenschaft
der Logik, Die subjektive Logik
Band 12:
Friedrich
Hogemann and Walter
(1816),
Jaeschke, 1980.
Volumes 1, 3, 5, and 20 are scheduled to appear in the next
couple of years.
Hegels theologische Jug ndwchriften, Ed. by Herman Nohl. TUbingen,

1907. A collection of his notes and manuscripts from the
1790's.
- M. -Knox.and
Early Theological Writings. Trans; and edited by T.
Richard Kroner. Chicago, 1948. Translation of parts of the
work listed above.
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The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy.Trans. by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf. Albany:' State
University of New York Press, 1977.Translation of the 1801
Different des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der
Philosophie... as edited in Gesammelte Werke B nd 4.
Faith and Knowledge. Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Translation of the 1802 essay Glauben und Nissen as edited in
Gesammelte .Werke Band 4.
Phanomenologie des Geistes. Ed. Johannes Hofmeister. Sechste
Auflage. Hamburg: F, Heiner Verlag, 1952. The standard
edition of this work which appeared first, in 1807, until
the Gesammelte Werke recension appeared in 1980. Note
that the Gesammelte WErke edition was used in this paper.
Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller, text analysis
by John Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. The older
translation by .Raillie has outlived its usefulness and ought
to be avoided when possible.
Wissenschaft der Logik. Two volumes. Edited by Georg Lesson.
Hamburg: F. Heiner Verlag, 1932 (1971 reprint).
Science of Logic. Transl. by A. V. Miller. London and New York:
George Allen & Unwin/Humanities Press, 1969 (reprint 1976).
The definitive translation, replacing the old Johnston-.
Struthers translation.
Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse
(1830). Ed. Nicolin and P8ggeler. Hamburg: F. Heiner Verlag,
1969. A good edition, but for the important "comments"
(zuslitzej one has to use the copy from either the Jubilaumsausgabe or the Suhrkamp edition. In my opinion (and others)
the "Encyclopedia" is the best one place to experience Hegel.
ilegel's Logic, being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Trans. by William Wallace.
Reprint of 1892 edition ..with new Preface. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975.
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, being Part Two of to Encyclopedia...
Translation by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
Megel's Philosophy of Mind, being Part Three of the Encyclopedia...
Translated by William Wallace. Reprint of 1894 edition.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
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Vorlesungen Ober die Philosophic, der Religion. Ed. by Georg

Lesson. Two volumes. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1974 reprint of 1925.
-Vorlesungen fiber die Beweise vom Dasein Gotten.;: Ed. by Georg

Lamson. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1973.
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion... Trans. by Speirs and

Sanderson. Three volumes. London: Routledge Regan Paul,
1895 (reprinted 1968). Translation of both of the above
works (remember, they were compiled posthumously, as were
those listed below). Translation poor but usable.
The Christian Religion. Ed. and trans. by Peter C. Hodgson.

Missoula, Mont.:Scholars Press, 1979. New translation of
Part III of thePhilosophy der Religion mentioned above.
Quality of translation is far superior to Spiers-Sanderson.
vorlesungen Ober die Geschichte der Philosophie, Volumes 17-19
in the above-listed Sfintliche Werke.
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E.S. Haldane.

Three volumes. New York: Humanities Press, 1955.
Ed. Johannes Hoffmeister.
Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1955. Highly instructive.

Die Vernunft in der Geschichte.

Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction.

Trans. by H.B. Nisbet, Intro. by D. Forbes. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975. A fine translation of the above.
G.W.F. Hegel on Art, Religion, Philosophy: Introductory Lectures
to the Realm of Absolute Spirit. Edited by J. Glenn Gray.

New York: Harper & Row (Torchbook #1463), 1970. After gaining an element&ry grasp of his system, these lectures are
an excellent means to fill out the picture in these three areas.
Berliner Schriften 1818- 1831. Ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg:

F. Meiner Verlag, 1956. Collection of valuable speeches,
articles, notes, etc. from his Berlin period. More notable
are his speech on the third centennial of the Augsburg.
Confession, his Preface to Hinrich's Die,RoligkOn;..
(translated in Weiss, Beyond Epistemology'--a very important
statement of his mature philosophy of religion), and his
review of GOshells Aphorismen. Very little is translated.
Briefe von and an Hegel. Ed. by Johannes Hoffmeister.

volumes in five. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1952 (vol. 4, part 2:
1981). A very important resource for study of his life
and thought. Very little has been translated.
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